Picuinhas entre intelectuais

É impressionante  a quantidade de picuinhas existentes entre intelectuais. No Brasil, então, é impossível, contar todas. Mas não é exclusividade do Brasil nem do segundo time de intelectuais. Neste momento nos seus blogs dois dos mais importantes economistas do mundo estão se alfinetando, Paul Krugman e Gregory Mankiw. Mankiw, que foi conselheiro econômico de Bush, não está gostando dos ataques feitos por Krugman às equipes econômicas de Bush inseridos no meio dos comentários sobre a atual equipe.

Abaixo segue os links da polêmica na ordem que foram postados, primeiro o comentário de Krugman, em seguida a resposta de Mankiw, e depois a resposta de Krugman.

http://krugman.blogs.nytimes.com/2008/11/22/the-grownups-are-coming/

http://gregmankiw.blogspot.com/2008/11/redefining-grownup-and-hack.html

http://krugman.blogs.nytimes.com/2008/11/27/touchy-touchy/

Mankiw para responder utiliza um  ranking dos economistas americanos para mostrar a diferença de posição entre a nova equipe e a de Bush. Algo tipicamente americano. Mas é sempre bom lembrar que quem tem menos prestígio a perder é sempre capaz de ousar e arriscar mais.

Obama e Lula

Já imaginava que o Obama seria tão cauteloso quanto o Lula na montagem do governo. Felizmente não temos no governo Obama alguém tão tosco quanto o Palocci. Em todo caso, há um risco real do governo Obama ser tão cauteloso que a cautela se transforme em acomodação em medo. A única diferença é a crise estará lá cutucando o Obama para não deixá-lo se acomodar e no caso do Lula nada impediu que a cautela virasse acomodação e agora que a crise chegou o governo está perdido, não consegue fugir das regrinhas que ele mesmo criou para deixar tudo como sempre esteve.

Citigroup em crise

Citi revived but its ills are not cured

By Peter Thal Larsen and Adrian Cox

Published: November 24 2008 19:36 | Last updated: November 24 2008 19:36

Ever since the Swiss state bailed out UBS last month, executives of the banking group have touted the plan as a blueprint for other governments seeking to rescue their troubled banks.

At first glance, the US government has taken a similar approach in recapitalising Citigroup. However, there are some important differences between the two plans that raise the question – does the government’s move mark a definitive end to the US bank’s problems?

The Citigroup bail-out represents an attempt to deal with the two aspects of the bank’s problems: a huge portfolio of potentially toxic assets – loans that have, or could, go bad – on its balance sheet, and a perceived lack of capital to absorb future losses from the economic downturn.

In broad terms, this resembles the UBS plan, where the Swiss government effectively removed toxic assets worth $60bn from the bank’s balance sheet. UBS’s losses on the assets were capped at $6bn. In return, UBS issued the Swiss government with $6bn of notes that are convertible into ordinary shares.

The Citigroup plan also underscores the evolution of the US authorities’ thinking on bailing out banks. Under the original Troubled Asset Relief Programme, launched in September, the US government set out to spend $700bn buying troubled assets from its banks. This morphed into a plan to use the funds to recapitalise banks by buying preferred stock.

“The initial proposal to buy bad assets wasn’t workable because you just couldn’t value them,” says Geoffrey Wood, a finance professor at City University’s Cass Business School. “You had to get capital into the banks.”

The Citigroup bail-out effectively combines both approaches: the government is largely capping the bank’s future losses on $306bn of assets, while boosting its capital by buying $27bn of preferred stock. Executives on Monday suggested that such an approach could also be applied to other US banks.

But, importantly, Citigroup’s exposure has not been fully capped: it will absorb the first $29bn of pre-tax losses on the assets, and a further 10 per cent of any losses above that figure. The assets are currently priced at their level at the end of October, although those assets that are valued on a mark-to-market basis will be revalued before the US government deal is completed.

Gary Crittenden, Citigroup’s chief financial officer, on Monday stressed it was “a very remote possibility” that the losses on the assets would rise above $29bn. The main attraction of the US government’s guarantee, he said, was to allow Citigroup to reduce the risk weighting it must attach to the assets to 20 per cent, freeing up capital.

The other question is how the US government’s recapitalisation of Citigroup will affect the business in the future. Mr Crittenden argued that the $27bn injection would boost the two most important measures of balance sheet strength: its Tier One capital ratio, and the ratio of its total common equity to risk-weighted assets.

However, rival bankers point out that the US government’s preferred shares cannot absorb any of Citigroup’s future losses until the common equity has been wiped out. They also point out that dividend payments on the US government’s preferred shares in Citigroup – which now total $52bn – will absorb a substantial amount of the bank’s future profits.

All this suggests that Citigroup will, at some point, have to rebuild its common equity base. As one banker put it on Monday: “This deal has clearly given Citigroup the oxygen to breathe and to look at their options, but it hasn’t necessarily put Citi back on a going concern basis.”

Copyright The Financial Times Limited 2008

http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/b505415e-ba57-11dd-92c9-0000779fd18c.html

O marido é mais famoso

http://www.latimes.com/news/nationworld/nation/la-na-romer25-2008nov25,0,2761865.story

From the Los Angeles Times

UC Berkeley economist named to Obama team

Christina Romer is chosen by President-elect Barack Obama to head his Council of Economic Advisors. She is an expert on the Great Depression and monetary policy.

By Richard C. Paddock
November 25, 2008
UC Berkeley economics professor Christina D. Romer, named Monday by President-elect Barack Obama to head his Council of Economic Advisors, is an expert on the Great Depression and monetary policy who is respected for her keen analytical skills, friends and colleagues say.
Associates praised Romer, 49, as a knowledgeable and tough-minded expert who can be expected to work well with other members of Obama's team as his administration attempts to overcome the country's economic crisis.
"She's a great choice," said Harvard University economics professor Gregory Mankiw, who chaired the economic council from 2003 to 2005 and is a longtime friend of Romer's. "She's a very good economist, a great public speaker, and . . . brings to the table an understanding of history that most economists don't have."
Nobel Prize-winning UC Berkeley economics professor Daniel McFadden, who taught Romer at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology in the early 1980s, also applauded her selection.
He said her historical perspective would be of great help as the Obama administration tries to halt the nation's economic slide.
"She understands in great detail what went wrong in the 1930s and what government policies were ineffective," McFadden said.
"I would describe her as a modern macro-economist who understands the power and the limits of the government to affect the economy," he said. "She has a sophisticated and nuanced view of what economic policy would do."
Romer's husband, David, also is an economics professor at UC Berkeley, and the two have long worked closely together, often co-authoring research papers. David Romer, like his wife, is a specialist in monetary policy. They have taught at the university for 20 years.
"They are a very close-knit team and work together on their research," McFadden said. "President Obama is getting two for the price of one."
The Romers have both been consultants to Obama's economic team. Other UC Berkeley scholars on the president-elect's transition team include Laura D'Andrea Tyson, former dean of the Haas School of Business who served as chairwoman of the Council of Economic Advisors under Clinton, and public policy professor Robert B. Reich, former Clinton Labor secretary.
Friends and colleagues said they expected Christina Romer to work cooperatively with former Treasury Secretary Lawrence Summers, who will take another key economic post in the new administration, becoming head of Obama's National Economic Council.
"I would guess that they will be natural allies on most issues," said Mankiw, who attended MIT with the Romers and was best man at their wedding. "On most policy issues they will see eye to eye."
In previous administrations, the two White House councils have worked independently of one another, with the Council of Economic Advisors providing analytical perspective and the National Economic Council taking a more political approach. It is unclear whether that division will remain under Obama.
Summers and the Romers have an unusual history with Harvard.
After serving in the Clinton administration, Summers became president of Harvard, but he resigned from his post in 2006 after provoking controversy by suggesting that women might have less aptitude than men for science and mathematics.
In May, Harvard was poised to lure the Romers away from UC Berkeley and hire them both as tenured professors, the Harvard Crimson, the university's student newspaper, reported.
But Christina Romer's appointment was vetoed by Summers' successor, Drew Faust, Harvard's first female president. David Romer then turned down his appointment and the couple remained at Berkeley.
A Harvard spokesman declined Monday to comment on the university's decision not to hire Christina Romer, saying the university does not discuss tenure cases.
James Wilcox, a professor at UC Berkeley's Haas school who has known Romer and her husband for decades, said Obama made a good choice.
"She has a stellar academic reputation," Wilcox said. "She is well-regarded for her work in economic history and monetary policy. She's really smart. She's really serious about ideas and what will work."
Wilcox predicted that Romer's background as a professor would be an asset as she works with noneconomists within the administration.
"One thing that really serves an economist well is to be a good teacher, and she is a really good teacher," he said. "She is really gifted at cutting right to the heart of the matter, and to be able to explain what is important and what is not important."
Romer's academic colleagues said they expected Romer's personal skills would help her in dealing with other White House policy makers.
"She can be tough, but she is not aggressively tough," McFadden said. "She is a nice tough person."
Paddock is a Times staff writer.
richard.paddock@latimes.com

Obama, apenas mais do mesmo? Mudar para ficar tudo como estava?

Plus Ça Change We Can Believe In

By Richard Cohen
Tuesday, November 25, 2008; A15

The unsurprising moderation of Barack Obama has caught many people by surprise. At this point, he seems intent on restoring a version of the old Clinton presidency -- Hillary Clinton running foreign policy, Robert Rubin's ensemble running the economy, Bill Richardson at Commerce and nary a certified cut 'n' runner on Iraq anywhere in sight. The erstwhile "change" candidate seems intent on vindicating that old French expression: The more things change, the more they remain the same. Oui.

What is surprising is that any of this should come as a surprise. All during the primary campaign, the main difference between Obama and Hillary Clinton was supposedly Iraq. This was the issue that propelled him to victory in Iowa, and this was the issue that stoked his supporters to paroxysms of enthusiasm. One candidate was for peace and the other was for the war -- and that was all there was to it.

Not quite. There was always a synaptic gap between Obama's ethereal image and his more grounded reality, and the sneaking suspicion that he and Clinton were not all that far apart on anything -- Iraq included. He conceded as much before the presidential race began. "I think very highly of Hillary," he told New Yorker editor David Remnick in 2006. "The more I get to know her, the more I admire her." In that same interview, Obama even narrowed the gap on Iraq: "I was running for the U.S. Senate, she had to take a vote, and casting votes is always a difficult test." In other words, who knows?

This is not to suggest that Obama thought the war in Iraq was really a good thing. It does suggest, though, that he recognized that the issue was never an easy one, and had he not represented a dovish Chicago district in the Illinois Senate, he might well have expressed a more nuanced opposition. After all, not a single one of Obama's U.S. Senate rivals for the Democratic presidential nomination voted against authorizing the war. Two of them are now about to play prominent roles in shaping and executing Obama's foreign policy -- Joe Biden, the vice president-elect, and Clinton, the presumptive secretary of state. As for the economy, a third Clinton administration would probably have looked like an Obama first: Lawrence Summers doing macro, Timothy Geithner doing micro and both of them making late-night calls to Bob Rubin in New York.

What, then, can explain the length and bitterness of the Democratic primary campaign? For the answer, we must look not to some talking head, but to Sigmund Freud and his phrase "the narcissism of small differences." By this, he meant the antipathy we feel toward people who resemble us. To an outsider, this explains the age-old Protestant-Catholic enmity or the proclivity of Shiites and Sunnis to slaughter one another. It also explains why Clinton and Obama supporters were at each other's throats. With the exception of the candidates themselves, they had so few differences. This is why so many Obama supporters despised Hillary Clinton -- and were despised in return.

Remember that? Remember when Clinton had no integrity, no character, when she lied about almost everything and could be trusted about almost nothing? Remember when she was excoriated for diabolically exonerating Obama of the charge that he was, secretly and very ominously, a Muslim by belling her cat of a remark with the portentous phrase "as far as I know"? And remember when her husband had supposedly revealed himself to be a racist? That was a calumny, a libel and a ferocious mugging of memory itself. But it was believed.

As is sometimes the case with passionate love, one can look back after a campaign and wonder: What was that all about? Usually, the passion of the campaign is shared by the candidates themselves and, for sure, their staffs. They live in a bubble infected by rumor and suspicion, a latter-day Borgian court of intrigue. But with Obama, he seemed always to distance himself from the heat of the campaign and to look down at it, as he did with that immense crowd in Berlin, as being of short-term use.

A presidential campaign is really a government looking for a parking space. Obama's campaign showed us a candidate of maximum cool. He has always remained ironically detached, and that has served him -- and now us -- very well indeed. It's now clear that he will not govern from the left and not really from the center but, as his campaign suggested, from above it all.

cohenr@washpost.com

http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2008/11/24/AR2008112402118.html?hpid=opinionsbox1

A crise mundial por Samir Amin

¿Debacle financiera, crisis sistémica ?
Respuestas ilusorias y respuestas necesarias.
Por Samir Amin
Informe introductivo - Foro Mundial de las Alternativas - Caracas, Octubre 2008

La crisis financiera era inevitable

La brutal explosión de la actual crisis económica no nos pilló desprevenidos. Además, yo la había evocado hace unos meses, cuando los economistas convencionales se esmeraban en minimizar sus consecuencias, particularmente en Europa. Para entender su génesis, conviene abandonar la actual definición del capitalismo, que hoy día se suele definir como "neoliberal globalizado". Esta calificación es engañosa y oculta lo esencial. El sistema capitalista actual está dominado por un puñado de oligopolios que controlan la toma de decisiones fundamentales en la economía mundial. Unos oligopolios que no sólo son financieros, constituidos por bancos o compañías de seguros, sino que son grupos que actúan en la producción industrial, en los servicios, en los transportes, etc. Su característica principal es su financiarización. Con eso conviene comprender que el centro de gravedad de la decisión económica ha sido transferido de la producción de plusvalía en los sectores productivos hacia la redistribución de beneficios ocasionados por los productos derivados de las inversiones financieras. Es una estrategia perseguida deliberadamente no por los bancos, sino por los grupos "financiarizados". Más aún, estos oligopolios no producen beneficios, sencillamente se apoderan de una renta de monopolio mediante inversiones financieras.
Este sistema es sumamente provechoso para los segmentos dominantes del capital. Luego no estamos en presencia de una economía de mercado, como se suele decir, sino de un capitalismo de oligopolios financiarizados. Sin embargo, la huida hacia delante en las inversiones financieras no podía durar eternamente cuando la base productiva sólo crecía con una tasa débil. Eso no resultaba sostenible. De ahí la llamada "burbuja financiera", que traduce la lógica del sistema de inversiones financieras. El volumen de las transacciones financieras es del orden de dos mil trillones de dólares cuando la base productiva, el PIB mundial sólo es de unos 44 trillones de dólares. Un gigantesco múltiplo. Hace treinta años, el volumen relativo de las transacciones financieras no tenía ese tamaño. Esas transacciones se destinaban entonces principalmente a la cobertura de las operaciones directamente exigidas por la producción y por el comercio nacional e internacional. La dimensión financiera de ese sistema de los oligopolios finaciarizados era – ya lo dije – el talón de Aquiles del conjunto capitalista. La crisis debía pues estallar por una debacle financiera.
Detrás de la crisis financiera, la crisis sistémica del avejentado capitalismo

Pero no basta con llamar la atención sobre la debacle financiera. Detrás de ella se esboza una crisis de la economía real, ya que la actual deriva financiera misma va a asfixiar el desarrollo de la base productiva. Las soluciones aportadas a la crisis financiera sólo pueden desembocar en una crisis de la economía real, esto es, una estagnación relativa de la producción y lo que ésta va a acarrear: regresión de los ingresos de los trabajadores, aumento del paro laboral, alza de la precariedad y empeoramiento de la pobreza en los países del Sur. En adelante debemos hablar de depresión y ya no de recesión.
Y detrás de esta crisis se perfila a su vez la verdadera crisis estructural sistémica del capitalismo. La continuación del modelo de desarrollo de la economía real, tal y como lo venimos conociendo, así como el del consumo que le va emparejado, se ha vuelto, por primera vez en la historia, una verdadera amenaza para el porvenir de la humanidad y del planeta.
La dimensión mayor de esta crisis sistémica concierne el acceso a los recursos naturales del planeta, que se han vuelto muchísimo más escasos que hace medio siglo. El conflicto Norte/Sur constituye, por lo tanto, el eje central de las luchas y conflictos por venir.
El sistema de producción y de consumo/despilfarro existente hace imposible el acceso a los recursos naturales del globo para la mayoría de los habitantes del planeta, para los pueblos de los países del Sur. Antaño, un país emergente podía retener su parte de esos recursos sin amenazar los privilegios de los países ricos. Pero hoy día ya no es el caso. La población de los países opulentos – el 15% de la población del planeta – acapara para su propio consumo y despilfarro el 85 % de los recursos del globo y no puede consentir que unos recién llegados accedan a estos recursos, ya que provocarían graves penurias que pondrían en peligro los niveles de vida de los ricos.
Si Estados unidos se han fijado como objetivo el control militar del planeta es porque saben que sin ese control no pueden asegurarse el acceso exclusivo de tales recursos. Como bien se sabe, China, la India y el Sur en su conjunto también necesitan esos recursos para su desarrollo. Para Estados Unidos se trata imperativamente de limitar ese acceso y, en última instancia, sólo existe un medio: la guerra.
Por otra parte, para ahorrar las fuentes de energía de origen fósil, Estados Unidos, Europa y otras naciones desarrollan proyectos de producción de agrocombustibles a gran escala, en detrimento de la producción de víveres, todavía afectados por el alza de los precios.
Las respuestas ilusorias de los poderes vigentes

Los poderes vigentes, al servicio de los oligopolios financieros, no tienen otro proyecto sino el de volver a poner en pie este mismo sistema. ¿Qué son esas intervenciones estatales sino las que les exige la misma oligarquía? Sin embargo, no es imposible el éxito de esta puesta en pie si las infusiones de dinero resultan suficientes y si las reacciones de las víctimas – las clases populares y las naciones del Sur – no dejan de ser limitadas. Pero en este caso el sistema sólo retrocede para mejor saltar y una nueva debacle financiera, aún más importante, será ineludible, ya que las "adaptaciones" previstas para la gestión de los mercados financieros y monetarios resultan ampliamente insuficiente, pues no ponen en tela de juicio el poder de los oligopolios.
Por otra parte, resultan divertidísimas estas respuestas a la crisis financiera mediante la inyección de fondos públicos astronómicos para restablecer la seguridad de los mercados financieros: privatizados ya los beneficios, en cuanto resultan amenazadas las inversiones financieras se socializan las pérdidas. ¡Cara: gano yo; cruz: pierdes tú!
Las condiciones de una respuesta positiva a los desafíos

No basta con decir que las intervenciones de los Estados pueden modificar las reglas del juego, atenuar las derivas. También es necesario definir sus lógicas y sus impactos sociales. Desde luego, en teoría, se podría volver a fórmulas de asociación de los sectores públicos y privados, fórmulas de economía mixta como ocurrió durante los "treinta años gloriosos" (los años 1945/1975) en Europa y durante la era de Bandung, en Asia y en África, cuando el capitalismo de Estado dominaba ampliamente, acompañado por políticas sociales fuertes. Pero este tipo de intervención del Estado no está a la orden del día. Y ¿ están las fuerzas sociales progresistas en medida de imponer una transformación de esta amplitud ? Todavía no, opino yo.
La verdadera alternativa pasa por el derrocamiento del poder exclusivo de los oligopolios, el cual es inconcebible sin, finalmente, su progresiva nacionalización democrática. ¿ Fin del capitalismo ? No lo creo. Creo en cambio que son posibles unas nuevas configuraciones de las relaciones de fuerzas sociales que obliguen al capital a ajustarse a las reivindicaciones de las clases populares y los pueblos. A condición de que las luchas sociales todavía fragmentadas y a la defensiva, en su conjunto, consigan cristalizar en una alternativa política coherente. Con esta perspectiva, resulta posible el comienzo de una larga transición del capitalismo al socialismo. Los avances en esa dirección, claro está, siempre serán desiguales de un país a otro y de una fase de su despliegue a otra.
Las dimensiones de la alternativa deseable y posible son múltiples y conciernen todos los aspectos de la vida económica, social, política. Evocaré a continuación las grandes líneas de esta respuesta necesaria.
1) - La reinvención por parte de los trabajadores de organizaciones apropiadas que hagan posible la construcción de su unidad con el fin de trascender su dispersión asociada a las formas de explotación vigente (paro laboral, precariedad, informalidad).
2) - La perspectiva es la de un despertar de la teoría y de la práctica de la democracia asociada al progreso social y al respeto de la soberanía de los pueblos y no disociada de éstos.
3) - Liberarse del virus liberal fundado en el mito del individuo, que ya pasó a ser tema histórico. Los rechazos frecuentes de los modos de vida asociados al capitalismo (múltiples enajenaciones, consumismo y destrucción del planeta) señalan la posibilidad de esta emancipación.
4) - Liberarse del atlantismo y del militarismo que le está asociado, ambos destinados a hacer aceptar la perspectiva de un planeta organizado sobre la base del apartheid a escala mundial.
En los países del Norte el desafío implica que la opinión general no se deje encerrar en un consenso de defensa de sus privilegios con respeto a los pueblos del Sur. El internacionalismo necesario pasa por el antimperialismo, no por el humanitarismo.
En los países del Sur, la estrategia de los oligopolios mundiales lleva consigo el hacer recaer el peso de la crisis sobre sus pueblos (desvalorización de sus reservas de cambio, baja de los precios de las materias primas exportadas y alza de los precios de los productos importados). La crisis ofrece la ocasión del renacimiento de un desarrollo nacional, popular y democrático autocentrado, que someta las relaciones con el Norte a sus exigencias, esto es, la desconexión. Lo cual implica:
a) El control nacional de los mercados monetarios y financieros
b) El control de las tecnologías modernas en adelante posible,
c) La recuperación del uso de los recursos naturales,
d) La derrota de la gestión globalizada, dominada por los oligopolios (la OMC) y la del control militar del planeta por Estados Unidos y sus aliados,
e) Liberarse de las ilusiones de un capitalismo nacional autónomo en el sistema y de los mitos del pasado.
f) La cuestión agraria, en efecto, está en el centro de las opciones por venir en los países del Tercer Mundo. Un desarrollo digno de llamarse así exige una estrategia política agrícola basada sobre la garantía del acceso a la tierra para todos los campesinos (la mitad de la humanidad). En contrapartida, las fórmulas preconizadas por los poderes dominantes - acelerar la privatización de la tierra agrícola y transformar la tierra agrícola en mercancía – llevan consigo el éxodo rural masivo que bien venimos conociendo. Como el desarrollo industrial de los países afectados no puede absorber dicha superabundante mano de obra, ésta se concentra en las barriadas miserables de los extrarradios ciudadanos o se deja tentar por las trágicas aventuras de una huida en balsa por el Atlántico. Existe una relación directa entre la supresión de la garantía del acceso a la tierra y el aumento de las presiones migratorias.
g) La integración regional, al favorecer el surgimiento de nuevos polos de desarrollo, ¿puede constituir una forma de resistencia y de alternativa? La regionalización es necesaria, tal vez no para gigantes como China y la India o incluso para Brasil, pero seguramente sí para otras muchas regiones, en el sudeste asiático, en África o en América Latina. Este continente está un poco por delante en ese terreno. Venezuela, oportunamente, ha tomado la iniciativa de crear el Alba (Alternativa bolivariana para América Latina y el Caribe) y el Banco del Sur (Bancosur), incluso antes de la crisis. Pero el Alba – un proyecto de integración económica y política – todavía no ha recibido la adhesión de Brasil ni la de Argentina. En cambio, el Bancosur, que supuestamente debe promover otra forma de desarrollo, asocia igualmente a estos dos países pese a que, hasta hoy, sigan teniendo una concepción convencional del papel que ha de desempeñar un banco.
Los avances en esas direcciones tanto en el Norte como en el Sur, que son la base del internacionalismo de los trabajadores y de los pueblos, constituyen las únicas garantías de reconstrucción de un mundo mejor, multipolar y democrático, única alternativa a la barbarie del envejecido capitalismo.
Más que nunca, la lucha por el socialismo del siglo XXI está a la orden del día.
Traducido por Manuel Colinas para Investig'Action - www.michelcollon.info
(revisado por el equipo editorial de Rebelión)

Más escolhas?

Foi anunciado o nome de Timothy Geithner como secretário do Tesouro dos EUA. Por alguns comentários nos jornais americanos na prática quem irá mandar será Lawrence Summers, que foi nomeado para o Conselho Econômico do presidente. Isto ocorreria para Summers não ter que se dedicar ao dia-a-dia burocrático da secretaria do Tesouro. Outra questão é que os dois são ligados ao ex-secretário do tesouro, Rubin, que hoje está no Citigroup, que está em crise. Todos trabalharam no governo Clinton. O que fez os republicanos questionarem a questão da mudança no governo Obama.

Obama está assumindo o país na crise, se nomear alguém que não conhece a máquina governamental encontrará grandes dificuldades de implementar políticas de resposta à crise imediatamente. É verdade que os nomeados são responsáveis pela atual crise, sustentaram e estimularam a desregulamentação financeira. Entretanto, eles possuem um caráter mais técnico do que teórico ou ideológico. Ou seja, tendem a ser mais pragmáticos na resposta à crise. Geithner ainda mais já que nem economista é, tem apenas a experiência como funcionário do FED de Nova York.

Enfim, a escolha da equipe econômica do governo Obama não diz nada sobre como será na prática a política econômica do governo Obama. Evidentemente não será uma revolução, mas não quer dizer que o Obama irá imitar o Lula e continuar fazendo o mesmo que as duas presidências anteriores, Clinton e Bush.

Entretanto, nomeando Hillary Clinton e levando vários nomes do governo Clinton para o governo, Obama corre o risco de ficar isolado no seu próprio governo.

Lula na "The Economist"

The Americas
Building on the B in BRIC

Nov 19th 2008

Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva, president of Brazil, sees a growing global role for big emerging economies

Upon first taking office in 2003, I pledged to end hunger in my country. Under the “Zero Hunger” banner, I put poverty-eradication and the alleviation of inequality at the forefront of government action. I was convinced that without dealing squarely with these two evils, it would be impossible to overcome centuries of economic backwardness and political unrest.

After nearly six years, much progress has been made. The number of very poor in Brazil has been slashed in half. The middle class is now in a majority, 52% of the population.

There is no cause for complacency. Many Brazilians are still unable to support themselves with dignity. Yet Brazilian society's response to eliminating social and economic deprivation is an indication of the profound changes the country is undergoing. Brazil has never been in a better position to meet the challenges ahead and is fully aware of its growing global responsibilities.

A global agenda

Brazil’s ethanol and biodiesel programmes are a benchmark for alternative and renewable fuel sources. Partnerships are being established with developing countries seeking to follow Brazil’s achievements—a 675m-tonne reduction of greenhouse-gas emissions, a million new jobs and a drastic reduction in dependence on imported fossil fuels coming from a dangerously small number of producer countries. All of this has been accomplished without compromising food security, which, on the contrary, has benefited from rising agricultural output.

Food scarcity threatens to undermine our achievements in reducing world poverty. Brazil is expanding agricultural production, reinforcing the country’s position as the world’s second-largest food exporter. At the same time, the pace of deforestation in the Amazon has been reduced by half, an indication that Brazil’s modern agro-industry poses no threat to the rainforest. We are setting up offices in developing countries interested in benefiting from Brazilian know-how in this field.

The replication in Latin America and Africa of many Brazilian social initiatives, including the Zero Hunger and HIV-AIDS programmes, is proof that the Millennium Development Goals are attainable at a relatively low cost. The antiretroviral manufacturing plant Brazil is set to open in Mozambique in 2009, for example, will help Africa to fight the HIV-AIDS epidemic.

In tackling climate change, collective action is the only way forward. The question-mark around the relevance of the G8 and the unreformed Security Council—not to mention the Bretton Woods institutions—highlights that it is no longer possible to exclude major emerging economies from the debate on issues of paramount importance to the global agenda. Greater democracy in international decision-making is essential if truly effective answers to global challenges are to be found. The magnitude of the current financial crisis, for instance, requires a vigorous response from the multilateral institutions.

Brazil remains committed to the successful conclusion of the Doha round. We wish to eliminate all barriers to international trade that strangle the productive potential of countless countries in Asia, Africa and Latin America. I have been in direct contact with leaders from some of the main players—the United States, India, China, Indonesia, Britain—and believe we still have a real chance to achieve a breakthrough on the relatively minor outstanding issues.

The industrialised world should take the lead in reducing greenhouse-gas emissions and provide support for developing nations to follow, but without having to compromise on domestic growth. Similarly, intellectual-property protection cannot take precedence over the ethical imperative of ensuring that poor populations have access to life-saving drugs.

Implementing this agenda requires a new, more transparent and rule-based international system. To this end, Brazil has joined India and South Africa in establishing IBSA, an association of the three major democracies of the global South focusing on co-operation and development issues. Within the framework of the BRIC countries (Brazil, Russia, India and China) and of the expanded G8, Brazil seeks to help identify the role of these emerging players in the unfolding multipolar order.

We have also joined our neighbours in setting up the Union of South American Nations (UNASUL), which aims to enhance regional integration and to ensure a stronger international presence for our block. UNASUL is setting up an energy plan, a defence council and a development bank.

Through such initiatives we will enhance dialogue and improve the mechanisms required to reinvigorate multilateralism. Most of all, we will strengthen our capacity to join hands in building a more peaceful, just and prosperous future for all.

http://www.economist.com/theworldin/displayStory.cfm?story_id=12494572&d=2009

Obama é o indivíduo universal, será Lula o nosso?

Donde arrecia el peligro

EUGENIO TRÍAS

Domingo, 23-11-08

1. La naturaleza escribe en caracteres matemáticos (Galileo). El mundo humano en jeroglíficos que parecen indescifrables. Alguien, de pronto, consigue dar con la clave de la piedra de Rosetta del Zeitgeist (espíritu del tiempo). Eso sucede rara vez, pero sucede. A ese personaje le llamaba Hegel individuo universal.

La historia no se mueve únicamente por ciegas fuerzas colectivas, como algunos pretenden. También las personas son actores responsables, capaces de modificar el relato histórico. Pocos filósofos ha habido con mayor atención y sensibilidad para todo lo singular como este filósofo alemán tan difamado y mal comprendido en ambientes neoliberales.

Hegel se refiere a Julio César, capaz de tener intuición de la forma imperial adecuada a las grandes conquistas romanas (militares y jurídicas). Pensaba sobre todo en su contemporáneo Napoleón, que tuvo la intuición de que los logros de la revolución francesa debían imponerse en toda Europa.

Hegel no tuvo ocasión ni circunstancia de reflexionar sobre el doble siniestro de su individuo universal. Si éste es, para decirlo en forma platónica, el verdadero pretendiente a la materialización de la Idea, el otro constituye su sombra deformada. Así, en los desdichados años treinta del pasado siglo, Stalin y Hitler. En lugar de intuir las coordenadas del nuevo mundo que se abre camino después del gran derrumbe económico-social de 1929, lo interpretan de forma particular (e imponen de modo atroz esa parcialidad afirmada): la raza aria, la clase proletaria.

El verdadero individuo universal capaz de comprender esa convulsión y crisis y de darle la medicina adecuada fue Roosevelt. Él fue el descifrador del idioma jeroglífico de su mundo y de su época. Esa intuición admitió refundaciones, como la de John F. Kennedy. Mostró la vitalidad de un estado-nación con voluntad imperial. Pero con fuerzas centrípetas en su seno que le podían sumir en un aislamiento auto-destructivo.

La experiencia del «cuerpo despedazado» (Jacques Lacan) la vivió Norteamérica el día del derribo de las torres gemelas. Coincidió con un país dividido y un presidente de escasas luces. En lugar de mantener la cabeza fría se lanzó a ciegas a guerras de venganza y destrucción. Las desigualdades sociales se agudizaron. Las clases medias se volvieron frágiles. El paradigma neoliberal se extremó hasta el paroxismo.

El dogma de un mercado que se regula por sí mismo, la fábula de Mandeville, la teoría de la mano invisible, esas ironías anglosajonas que pretendían adelgazar el estado para los negocios y engrosarlo en los despliegues militares, alcanzó en estos últimos ocho años su forma extremada. En su voluntad y porfía por actuar sin ningún control Norteamérica experimentó declive en su hegemonía imperial.

La historia es más irónica que las teorías neoliberales. La historia se rige, según Hegel, discípulo aventajado de Adam Smith, por la astucia de la razón: hace del vicio privado -la ambición- el anzuelo para la materialización de la Idea que informe al espíritu del tiempo.

2. Barack H. Obama ha sabido descifrar el código genético de nuestro tiempo, su piedra de Rosetta. Nadie hasta él había conseguido hacerlo con una maestría tan deslumbrante. Cuanto más se conocen los detalles del equipo que supo «leer por dentro» (intus-legere) las posibilidades que el gran hallazgo tecnológico de la era global encerraba, la Red, mayor asombro produce su extraordinaria victoria. De un plumazo consiguió que le apoyase un colectivo invencible: visitantes de Internet capaces de movilización voluntaria prestos a recaudar pequeños fondos en cantidades inverosímiles.

Toda una época política quedó pulverizada. Quizás no se vuelva a hablar en bastante tiempo de lobbies. Todos los protagonistas del proceso quedaron retratados como fotografías con pátina de antigüedad, desde Hillary Clinton hasta Mac Cain y Sarah Pallin. Sumó además una capacidad de predicación política de fluidez onírica: infinito discurso siempre bien modulado, de talante apolíneo. No se oía nada semejante en ningún rincón de nuestro mundo.

Conociendo el patriotismo profundo de todos sus compatriotas removió las viejas aguas, y hasta arrancó la voz más lírica a su contrincante en su espléndida y nobilísima felicitación al vencedor. El propio George Bush parece también tocado por este nuevo modo de obviar todas las dificultades.

El genio hace fácil lo difícil. También en política. Consigue que parezca espontáneo y natural lo que se supone fruto de esfuerzos titánicos. Decía Kant que la naturaleza es bella cuando parece obra de arte, y que el arte es bello cuando parece naturaleza. El genio en arte y el individuo universal en política son capaces de volver fácil y natural lo que parece imposible. De ahí el carácter onírico -de hermano de otro planeta- que a veces se asocia a Obama.

Lo que parece irreal se vuelve de pronto evidencia: ¡Que los jóvenes vayan a las urnas, que los afroamericanos aparquen sus legítimos resentimientos y hagan colas para votar (y le voten en proporciones búlgaras), que los latinos y demás minorías étnicas se vuelquen sobre el personaje! Y que los blancos, en pirámide invertida por edades, le den también su apoyo.

La costra de escepticismo político que a todos nos ha invadido desde la caída del muro de Berlín, agudizada por los desmanes bélicos de la única potencia vencedora de la guerra fría, parece caerse a pedazos. La política, cual Ave Fénix, renace de sus cenizas. No vivirá Baudrillard para darse cuenta de que la reducción de todo a simulacro ha terminado. O para constatar la falacia de toda precipitada ontología de lo virtual. Ya no podrán seguirse entonando esos trenos a los que el pensamiento europeo nos tiene acostumbrados, donde la filosofía oficia siempre tétricas ceremonias de enterramiento: muerte del Arte, muerte de Dios, muerte del Hombre, descalabro de todo criterio ético, fin de la pasión política.

Se siente la necesidad y exigencia de lo Ideal. Al final Schiller el idealista estaba en lo cierto. O el Kant de los Ideales de la Razón práctica. El viejo sueño de una Edad del Espíritu que sirve de idea regulativa resplandece en el horizonte.

3. Llegarán días para pasar del sueño a la realidad. Pero hemos estado tan golpeados por oleadas de escepticismo, realismo de vuelo gallináceo y deprimente nihilismo, que la aparición de este personaje en el escenario político parece revalidar el Principio Esperanza. Es una muestra de la vitalidad de Estados Unidos, capaz de lo peor y de lo mejor. Hoy por hoy es el país que mejor sabe leer el idioma jeroglífico del Zeitgeist.

Fue el país más capaz de dar con la traducción equivocada. George Bush fue, en este sentido, el doble siniestro anticipado del nuevo presidente: siempre antepuso lo particular sobre lo universal; los delirios de su pequeño equipo ultramontano sobre las verdaderas necesidades y exigencias del papel de Estados Unidos dentro del nuevo mundo global. George Bush ha dado pie a que se pensara en el declive del Imperio. Barack H. Obama, en cambio, sabe que Estados Unidos requiere una adaptación al nuevo mundo global. Éste no admite hegemonías que no sean compartidas.

Puede decirse, con Hölderlin, que justamente «donde hay peligro / crece lo salvador». El peligro ha arreciado. El abismo sube, se alza, se desborda. La quiebra financiera ha sido un verdadero terremoto.

Barack H. Obama, ese medicine man, como lo llama Moisés NaÏm en un artículo en el que habla de la necesidad que el mundo tiene, de vez en cuando, de un auténtico chamán, dispone de tiempo y apoyos para poder descifrar la piedra de Rosetta del mundo de hoy, y escribir en prosa lo que predicó en campaña con auténtico vuelo mágico chamánico, y en bella y apolínea versificación.

http://www.abc.es/20081123/opinion-tercera/donde-arrecia-peligro-20081123.html

Infelizmente a declaração final não reflete este sonho.

EU dreams fade of taming capitalism

By George Parker and Andrew Ward in Washington and Ben Hall in Paris

Published: November 14 2008 18:37 | Last updated: November 14 2008 18:37

For some European politicians, this weekend’s G20 summit looked like a dream come true when it was first announced: a chance to tame unbridled “Anglo-Saxon capitalism” at a time of American economic weakness.

Even better, in Barack Obama the US had elected a president who appeared to understand, like the Europeans, the importance of an active state and who seemed perfectly equipped to deliver this new economic order.

Spain’s governing Socialist party summed up the heady mood in some parts of Europe in an internal document, seen by El Mundo, that identified the summit as a moment of historic change. “The origins of this crisis lie in neoliberal and neoconservative ideology,” it said.

As the summit has approached, however, those dreams have started to fade. Some European leaders have overplayed their hand with calls for far-reaching new regulatory structures, annoying their American hosts in the process.

There has also been the crushing disappointment for European summiteers that Mr Obama will not attend, or even drop by for dinner.

Instead of photo-opportunities and face time with Mr Obama, the Europeans are left with President George W Bush, who used an eve-of-summit speech to deliver a lecture that appeared to be directed at some of his transatlantic guests. “History has shown that the greater threat to economic prosperity is not too little government involvement in the market but too much,” he said.

Mr Obama’s team is also wary of the European Union’s fondness for multilateral regulatory solutions, perhaps one reason why he decided to stay away.

The travelling delegations from European G20 members – Britain, France, Germany and Italy – have been left to make arrangements to speak to Mr Obama’s representatives to try to map out a strategy for future summits.

Nicolas Sarkozy – the French president who claims the European record, 30 minutes, for a phone conversation with Mr Obama – says he knows the incoming president’s mind on financial regulation. Other leaders have typically had to settle for 10 minutes, although UK diplomats joke that half of the French president’s chat comprised translation.

European leaders might reflect that slightly more subtle approach work could have ensured a warmer welcome from the outgoing and incoming US administrations, whose support they need for global reforms.

Gordon Brown, Britain’s prime minister, raised some hackles by proclaiming his “world leadership” in calling for a fiscal stimulus. President Bush has already launched one, worth $170bn compared with the UK’s $5.9bn. So too have the Chinese, Japanese and Germans.

Mr Sarkozy’s proposal that agreement on reforms be settled within 100 days has also irritated some in Washington, who do not like the idea of having their legislative timetable dictated from abroad. The French president has shelved his plan for the International Monetary Fund to become a “regulator of regulators”.

Silvio Berlusconi approached the summit by praising Mr Obama’s “sun tan”. The Italian prime minister went on to defend his Russian allies, criticising the US for “provoking” Moscow with its missile defence shield.

http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/e64990ca-b26f-11dd-bbc9-0000779fd18c,dwp_uuid=60a3db68-b177-11dd-b97a-0000779fd18c.html

Limites do G-20

Leaders temper G20 ambitions

By FT reporters

Published: November 14 2008 19:38 | Last updated: November 15 2008 00:14

World leaders played down expectations of dramatic breakthroughs at the start of this weekend’s Group of 20 summit on the economic crisis on Friday, conceding that the political transition in the US made big decisions unlikely.

However, European leaders kept up their drive for a timetable to reform global finance, as figures showed that the eurozone had fallen into recession for the first time since the birth of the single currency.

The Bush administration continued to resist a lurch towards regulation but conceded that there could be discussions on subjects such as hedge funds and derivative markets that it has blocked in the past.

“Everyone agrees we need to look at these things,” said Tony Fratto, a White House spokesman. But he added: “We don’t want to be chasing bogeymen.” The Barack Obama team kept its distance from the talks, even as its representatives met with visiting delegations.

The G20 was expected to pledge to support world growth, without promising any co-ordinated fiscal stimulus; agree to principles for financial regulation; lay out an action plan and commission working groups to report back on issues including regulation of securitised markets, accounting standards, credit ratings and pay schemes in the financial sector.

Support grew for a “college of supervisors” from different nations to monitor global banks. Leaders will review the International Monetary Fund and its resources, with Japan offering an extra $100bn, and recommit to free trade. They appeared set to reconvene in the spring.

While China and other emerging nations at the summit generally kept a low profile, their presence marked a historic recognition that industrialised nations could no longer dictate the rules of global finance.

“This summit is not going to be a second Bretton Woods,” a European diplomat said, invoking a phrased used by British prime minister Gordon Brown and Mr Sarkozy. “It is the beginning of a process.”

Hank Paulson, Treasury secretary, indicated that the US would accept some criticism. “We have in many ways humiliated ourselves as a nation with some of the problems that have taken place here.” But he said the US would not accept sole responsibility for the crisis.

Reporting by Krishna Guha, Daniel Dombey and George Parker in Washington; Ralph Atkins in Frankfurt, Ben Hall in Paris and Chris Bryant in Berlin

http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/90aeaf10-b27e-11dd-bbc9-0000779fd18c,dwp_uuid=60a3db68-b177-11dd-b97a-0000779fd18c.html

Tempos difíceis, a depressão está se tornando uma ameaça real!

Debt and deflation
Depressing times

Nov 13th 2008
From The Economist print edition

Are rich economies heading merely for a bout of falling prices, or for a 1930s-style deflationary spiral?

Illustration by S. Kambayashi

IN JUST a few brutal months, the prospects for the world economy have deteriorated with remarkable speed. Rich countries had seemed set for a shallow, muddle-through recession; now a much deeper slump is on the cards. In a sign of growing concern about American consumers, the Treasury and Federal Reserve on November 12th focused their rescue efforts on loans for cars and college and on credit cards. Central banks, recently so fearful of inflation, are now slashing interest rates to stop it falling too far. It will not be easy: deflation—annual falls in consumer prices—is increasingly likely next year. But recalling the 1930s, policymakers will be anxious to ensure that it does not take hold and turn crisis into catastrophe.

To consider the possibility of falling prices may seem odd when inflation is still uncomfortably high. In America, it reached 5.6% in July, the highest rate since 1991. In the same month inflation in the euro area surged to 4%. Britain’s consumer-price inflation hit 5.2% in September, well above the government’s target of 2%. This high inflation was mostly the result of the surge in commodity prices in the first half of the year. “Core” inflation, excluding food and energy costs, was far more stable.

But since the summer the commodity boom has turned to bust, changing the inflation outlook dramatically. The price of a barrel of crude oil has tumbled from a peak of $147 in July to below $60 in recent days. The Economist’s index of non-oil commodity prices has fallen by 40% since July. If raw-material prices remain at these lower levels, the year-on-year change in the retail prices of food and fuel will turn sharply negative in 2009.

That will add to other downward pressure on inflation. As economies fall deeper into recession and spending shrinks, firms will have to compete harder for sales by pricing their wares keenly. A glut of supply is evident in America’s jobs market: the unemployment rate rose to 6.5% in October. A year earlier it was just 4.8%.

Falling food prices have quickly had an effect on inflation in China, which fell to 4% in October from a peak of 8.7% in February. In the rich world, a period of deflation seems more likely in America than in Europe. Crude-oil costs are a bigger slice of the prices American consumers pay for petrol: lower sales taxes and fuel duties mean swings in oil markets have a bigger effect on pump prices. Motor fuel also accounts for a larger share of Americans’ spending, so falling prices will depress inflation by more. Prices tend to be less “sticky”: they respond more readily to economic conditions because markets are more flexible than in Europe. A stronger dollar will add to deflationary pressures in America while easing them elsewhere.

The year-on-year fall in oil prices is likely to be steepest in the third quarter next year, when the base will be this summer’s peak. Economists at Goldman Sachs reckon that America’s inflation rate will briefly turn negative at that point. Inflation in the euro area seems set to reach a low then too, even if prices do not actually fall. Speaking after the European Central Bank’s (ECB) half-point cut in interest rates on November 6th, Jean-Claude Trichet, the bank’s chief, allowed that inflation could fall well below the ECB’s target ceiling of 2% next year. But such a drop would be “short-lived and therefore not relevant” to interest-rate decisions. The Bank of England sees deflation as more than just a remote risk. Its Inflation Report, published on November 12th, puts the spread of likely inflation rates at between -1% and 3% in two years’ time. It is the first time the bank’s fan chart, which projects where inflation is likely to lie nine times out of ten, has encompassed deflation.

A commodity-led fall in inflation ought to be good news for rich economies. It boosts consumers’ real incomes and fattens firms’ profit margins. Yet there is something pernicious about inflation falling too far, too fast. Because falling prices make debt more expensive, indebted households would be more anxious to pay off loans, even as other consumers were benefiting from a boost to their purchasing power. If deflation took hold, the gap in demand left by those fleeing debt would not be filled by cash-rich consumers, who tend to be less free-spending.

A deadly mix of falling prices and high leverage could foment a “debt-deflation” of the type first described by Irving Fisher, an American economist, in 1933. In this schema, debt-laden firms and consumers rush to repay loans as credit dries up. That hurts demand and leads to price cuts. The deflation in turn increases the real cost of debt. It also means that real interest rates can’t be negative, and so are undesirably high. That spurs yet more repayment so that, in Fisher’s words, the “liquidation defeats itself.”

Fisher’s theory is of more than just academic interest. Recent lending surveys by the Federal Reserve and the ECB showed a larger share of banks tightened their lending criteria in October than in July. Such is the concern in America that on November 12th regulators said they would scrutinise the dividend policies of banks that did not increase lending.

The surveys also revealed a reluctance to borrow, which tallies with signs of a collapse in spending. Foreign orders for German capital goods slumped by 14% in September, suggesting firms worldwide are cutting investment. Car sales in America and Europe are plummeting. American retailers, such as Neiman Marcus, J.C. Penney and Gap, reported double-digit falls in sales in the year to October. The retail data in Britain are grim too, which is a big worry for firms which have been through the private-equity mill and are loaded with debt. If sales do not respond soon to interest-rate cuts, some retailers may resort to deep discounts as Christmas approaches.

Bond markets expect consumer prices in America to fall by as much as 2½% over the next year, according to Mark Capleton, of the Royal Bank of Scotland. Inflation in the euro area is expected to be close to zero. When prices were climbing rapidly, central banks fretted that consumers’ inflation expectations would rise in response. They will now be as keen to keep them from falling too far. That means interest rates in rich countries may soon fall to zero; some are already close (see article).

Deflation is not the only fear, however. Investors seem keen to hedge against all outcomes. “The options market tells us that inflation uncertainty has rocketed,” says Mr Capleton. That reflects fears that policymakers, in their efforts to tackle deflation, will go too far the other way.

Dívida Pública como % do PIB. Isso é neoliberalismo?

http://www.economist.com/world/asia/displayStory.cfm?source=hptextfeature&story_id=12606998

Quem salvará a indústria automobilística?

O secretário do Tesouro dos EUA resite em ajudar a GM, e aí mora o problema. Todo tomador de decisões deve fazer escolhas. Em geral, nota-se os erros, mas as conseqüências passam despercebidas. O problema dos momentos de crise financeira é que qualquer movimento equivocado é amplificado e a crise realimentada. A GM já estava com problemas antes de estourar a crise. Mas a falência da GM gerará uma reação em cadeia, porque se os bancos não querem financiar mais a GM apesar do seu tamanho e importância no mundo, se ele quebrar, qual empresa os bancos estarão dispostos a financiar? O crédito irá se contrair ainda mais para a economia real, mais empresas entrarão em situação de falência, e a recessão se aprofundará. Por outro lado, se o governo ajuda a GM, todas as outras empresas vão esperar o mesmo tratamento e podem começar a se arrisacarem em negócios nebulosos. Períodos de crises pode ser lucrativo para quem estiver disposto a se expor a um risco maior. Outra questão a ser considerada é que o governo americano pode ajudar a GM  e problema não ser resolvido. E aí mais uma vez a crise será realimentada, e as políticas subseqüentes do governo serão encaradas com desconfiança. Governos precisam de ousadia, a linha entre o fracasso e o sucesso é muito tênue.

On the edge

Nov 13th 2008
From The Economist print edition

After the bank bail-out, it is now Detroit’s carmakers who are pleading for help

Corbis

IF NOTHING else, the revelation by General Motors (GM) on November 7th that it is in danger of running out of cash before the end of the year has concentrated minds. The reaction within the embattled car industry, and in Washington, DC, has been the same: we knew it was bad, but we did not know it was that bad. Ford is in a similar position, although its cash should hold out for a few months longer.

As for Chrysler, the smallest and weakest of Detroit’s Big Three, the precise state of its finances are harder to gauge because it is privately held. But the increasingly desperate attempts by Cerberus Capital Management, the private-equity firm that owns 80% of Chrysler, to offload some or all of it to another carmaker (GM said on November 7th that it had walked away from such a deal) suggest that its future as an independent entity is all but over.

What will happen next? The shareholders have been more or less wiped out, the credit markets are closed and neither GM nor Ford has any non-core assets that anyone wants to buy, with the possible exception of Ford’s 33% stake in Mazda, a profitable Japanese carmaker. The North American car market should come back strongly in 2010 or 2011, but for all practical purposes, that is light-years away: North American sales are running at their lowest levels since the early 1980s, when the population was 50m smaller. There are just two broad options: either the federal government steps in to save Ford and GM (Chrysler is probably unsalvageable) or America’s two biggest car firms must seek Chapter 11 bankruptcy protection.

In many ways, Chapter 11 was designed for just such a contingency. For all their present agonies, both Ford and GM have good long-term prospects. They have relatively healthy businesses in Europe and have been doing well in emerging markets, such as China, where there is vast potential.

They are also nearing the final stage of a lengthy and painful restructuring of their North American operations. Two million units of capacity have been stripped out; factories are being converted to produce more fuel-efficient cars; and a landmark deal with the United Auto Workers union in 2007 paved the way to cutting $1,000 of costs on every car they make from next year. “The river they are swimming across has been getting wider and deeper, but the pot of gold on the other side has been getting bigger as well,” says David Cole of the Center for Automotive Research.

However, there is considerable scepticism both within the industry and among analysts as to whether Chapter 11 is a way forward for GM and Ford (though it may, some concede, be more appropriate for Chrysler). Mr Cole says that “it would kill them in the market”. The fear is that rather than give the firms a breathing space in which they could complete the restructuring of their operations and extract further concessions from the union, Chapter 11 would set off a downward spiral.

Consumer surveys that suggest that 80-90% of prospective customers would abandon the products of a carmaker that had filed for bankruptcy protection. When airlines went into Chapter 11, most of their passengers stuck with them, reasoning they would be at least be in business long enough for tickets bought for trips just a few weeks away to be honoured.

Cars are different. A car is the most expensive purchase many consumers make, and by buying a car they also enter into a long-term contract. Buyers expect their 60,000-mile warranties to be honoured, parts to be kept supplied and their dealers not to have disappeared. Used-car values are also a critical part of the deal. If the firm that made the car has gone bust, it becomes virtually unsellable secondhand.

A further reason why Chapter 11 might not work for the carmakers, says Mark Oline, an analyst at Fitch Ratings, is that they have very little scope for further cost-cutting. “They’re not being crushed by wage and benefit costs—it’s about revenue and products now,” he says. Bankruptcy would do nothing to speed up the introduction of vital new models.

Those arguments may have weighed heavily with both Barack Obama, the president-elect, and the Democrats in Congress, who are moving towards sanctioning a bail-out package. They have gained added force from estimates of the economic fallout that could follow bankruptcy. Rod Lache, an analyst at Deutsche Bank, believes it would imperil many of the component-makers in North America, which in turn would hit the foreign-owned “transplant” factories that make up the rest of America’s car industry.

Mr Cole’s firm has modelled a scenario in which Detroit’s production falls by 50%. He estimates that in the first year that would cost 2.5m jobs: 240,000 from the carmakers themselves; 795,000 from suppliers and 1.4m from other firms indirectly affected. The cost in transfer payments and lost taxes would exceed $100 billion over three years. Some of Mr Cole’s assumptions are likely to be too pessimistic, but his blood-curdling forecast and others like it have helped to convince legislators that the $50 billion of help that the carmakers are asking for would be cheap at the price.

How and when the rescue funds will arrive is less certain. Nancy Pelosi, the House speaker, has called for a bill giving the carmakers access to the $700 billion Troubled Asset Relief Programme (TARP) established to shore up failing banks. But Hank Paulson, the treasury secretary, said on November 12th that this was not what the TARP had been intended for. Some are calling for a repeat of the scheme used to bail out Chrysler in 1979. On that occasion, in exchange for a loan of $1.5 billion, the government received warrants that it eventually sold for a profit.

A “lame duck” session of Congress could be convened as early as next week to pass the necessary legislation. President Bush might still veto it, but is less likely to do so if Mr Obama backs the plan. His recent victory is at least one piece of luck to have come the carmakers’ way.

http://www.economist.com/world/international/displaystory.cfm?story_id=12601839

Sutilezas e hipocrisias da diplomacia, soberania não, mas suserania sim!

Britain's suzerain remedy

Nov 6th 2008
From The Economist print edition

To control Tibet’s future, China extends control over its past

IT WAS an early-21st-century solution to an early-20th-century problem. On October 29th, at the end of a short statement published on his ministry’s website, Britain’s foreign secretary, David Miliband, quietly junked his country’s long-standing position on Tibet. Uniquely among the world’s countries, Britain had not explicitly recognised Chinese sovereignty over the region. Rather it acknowledged its “suzerainty”.

Quite what the term means has been obscure even to British diplomats. But what it does not mean—that China enjoys full sovereignty over China and has done so for centuries—has been enough to irk Chinese officials. It bolstered claims that Tibet was not part of China until its troops occupied it in 1951.

Mr Miliband describes Britain’s old position as “based on the geopolitics of the time”—ie, the early 1900s, when British adventurers were entering Tibet from India and the Qing empire was disintegrating in China. He says this “anachronism” has “clouded” Britain’s ability to get its points across on Tibet: on the importance of respect for human rights and of greater Tibetan autonomy.

His officials say he has merely aligned Britain’s stance with that of its European Union partners and of America. They point out that even the Dalai Lama, Tibet’s exiled spiritual leader, argues not for Tibetan independence, but for a “middle way” of greater autonomy within China. But that, in fact, is rather reminiscent of some definitions of “suzerainty”. And the Dalai Lama has never admitted, as China would like, that Tibet has always been “an inalienable part of China”. Arguing about its past status, he has insisted, is beside the point.

Moreover, he has recently shown signs of exasperation with his 20-year pursuit of the middle way. With his envoys in Beijing this week for an eighth round of talks with China since 2002, the Dalai Lama has said his trust in China’s good faith is “thinning, thinning, thinning”. His conciliatory policies have faced mounting criticism from Tibetans since bloody riots in Tibet earlier this year. A meeting later this month in Dharamsala, his seat in northern India, is to review his exiled government’s stance.

Curiously, Mr Miliband’s statement does not, in so many words, recognise Chinese sovereignty. But officials say it means that, as far as Britain is concerned, “Tibet is part of China. Full stop.” For many Tibetans, however, the correct punctuation remains a question-mark.

Reunião do G-20, o resultado é apenas uma carta de intenções

Na imprensa brasileira apareceu alguns entusiastas com a reunião do G-20. Entretanto, o resultado não passade uma carta de intenções a espera de uma liderança que possa levar um programa de recuperação adiante. O mundo está esperando por Obama e ainda assim não é certo que com a posse dele haja espaço para uma reforma no sistema financeiro internacional. A reafirmação do livre mercado no meio das discussões sobre a regulação faz parecer que a crise foi apenas resultado de um erro na política de regulação bancária dos EUA. Mas nada mais distante da verdade, a crise reflete a forma da acumulação financeira numa economiade mervados financeiros liberalizados. Obviamente que o aumento do protecionismo comercial seria desastroso para alguns países como resposta à crise. Entretanto, o fim da livre circulação do capital financeiro é fundamental para a estabilidade do sistema. É preciso recuperar a velha idéia keynesiano sobre a eutanásia do rentista.

Sobre princípios, todos concordam, a questão é definir o significado concreto dos princípios

Segundo o Financial Times, During the meeting, Hu Jintao, the Chinese President, called for ”a new international financial order that is fair, just, inclusive and orderly”. Este é o problema, com absoluta certeza todos os presentws concordam com uma ordem internacional justa, inclusiva. O problema é que para cada um, isso significa uma coisa diferente. Por exemplo, para o Bush qualquer ordem que viole o princípio do livre mercado não será considerada justa. E aí na ausência de consenso tudo continua como dantes!

Farra no G-20

O Brasil apoiou a entrada oficial da Espanha no G-20 e espera a incoporação de outro país em desenvolvimento para que se torne G-22. Pelo jeito o Brasil quer incoporar o assembleísmo do PT nos organismos internacionais. Apoiar a entrada de novos países contribui para estreitar as relações com os países ingressantes. Mas isso também significa que o poder ficará mais difuso, o Brasil perde impórtância relativa e fica mais difícil revolver alguma coisa, e isso é especialmente problemático se se quer realmente que o G-20 substitua o G-8. Além disso, no caso particular da Espanha, o Brasil não deveria facilitar nada para os espanhóis depois do tratamento recebido pelos brasileiros que viajam para a Espanha.

A notícia sobre as intenções brasileiras pode ser lida aqui.

Isso sim, é inédito e assustador!

Durante a reunião do G-20, o diretor gerente do FMI Dominique Strauss-Kahn disse que é preciso aumentar o gasto público mundial em 1,2 bilhã0 de dólares, ou seja, é preciso uma política fiscal ativa por parte do Estado para estimular a economia. E além disso os Estados devem também reduzir as taxas de juros. Os críticos do FMI devem estar vibrando com esta guinada de 180º graus nas sugestões do Fundo, que em geral só sabe repetir a cantilena sobre contenção da demanda e do gasto público. Interessante notar que neste momento o FMI, então, está à esquerda do governo brasileiro que ainda pratica uma política excessivamente ortodoxa, que caso o mundo caminhe mesmo para deflação apenas irá acentar os efeitos da crise no Brasil.

O fato de termos um francês na direção do FMI é uma vantagem. Qualquer economista francês aprendeu a conviver com uma política ativa por parte do Estado ainda que tenha uma visão ortodoxa da economia. Seria trágico se tivéssemos algum alemão formado da linha do Bundesbank.

Vc assiste muita TV? Mau sinal, vc é infeliz!

Pessoas infelizes passam mais tempo assistindo à TV, indica pesquisa

Pessoas infelizes passam mais tempo na frente da televisão, segundo estudo da Universidade de Maryland, nos Estados Unidos. Avaliando, por 30 anos, cerca de 30 mil adultos, os pesquisadores descobriram que as pessoas mais felizes eram mais socialmente ativas, prestavam mais serviços religiosos, votavam com mais freqüência e liam mais jornais. Em contraste, as infelizes relatavam mais tempo livre indesejável (51%, contra 19% das “muito felizes”) e assistiam 20% mais TV no tempo livre, independentemente de escolaridade, renda e estado civil. Esses dados, confrontados com estudos anteriores que indicam que a televisão é bem classificada como passatempo quando as pessoas estão assistindo, indicam que “a TV pode oferecer aos telespectadores um prazer de curto prazo, mas às custas de um mal-estar de longo-prazo”. Porém, ainda não está claro se a felicidade leva as pessoas a ver menos TV, ou se o tempo em frente à TV leva à infelicidade.

http://blogboasaude.zip.net/arch2008-11-09_2008-11-15.html#2008_11-14_12_12_53-119648571-0

Evolução do preço da prata

Deflação e o ouro

Como se pode ler aqui, as reservas internacionais da Bolívia cairam em função de uma queda no preço do ouro. Uma queda no preço do ouro tanto pode ser um sinal de reversão da crise, o normal é que na crise os investidores demandem ouro por ser considerado um reserva segura de valor e com isso ele se valorize e que nos períodos de bonança os investidores procurem investimentos mais lucrativos. Por outro lado, se ainda estamos na crise e o preço do ouro cai é preocupante, sinalizaria uma forte tendência à deflação geral.

 

 

Se compararmos a evolução do preço do ouro entre 2000 e 2008 com o que está ocorrendo em 2008, se nota o quanto o preço do ouro foi inflacionado, e que por isso agora o ouro sofre com a deflação geral que atinge os mercados financeiros.  O que deixa uma questão sobre o risco da deflação generalizada nos mercados internacionais de bens transacionáveis, especialmente commodities.

Mais sobre soft power e liderança americana

Barack Obama y el poder de los Estados Unidos

by Joseph S. Nye

CAMBRIDGE – Uno de los primeros retos a que se enfrentará el Presidente Barack Obama son los efectos de la crisis financiera en curso, que ha puesto en duda el futuro del poder de los Estados Unidos. Un artículo publicado en la revista The Far Eastern Economic Review afirma que “El desmoronamiento de Wall Street presagia un movimiento telúrico global: el comienzo del debilitamiento del poder de los Estados Unidos”. El Presidente ruso, Dmitri Medvedev, considera la crisis como una señal de que el liderazgo global estadounidense está llegando a su fin, y el Presidente venezolano, Hugo Chávez, ha declarado que ahora Beijing es mucho más relevante que Nueva York.

Con todo, el dólar, el símbolo del poder financiero estadounidense se ha fortalecido, en lugar de debilitarse. Como señala Kenneth Rogoff, profesor de Harvard y ex economista en jefe del FMI, “Es irónico que, dado que acabamos de cometer errores graves, la respuesta de los extranjeros sea traer más dinero. No saben a dónde más recurrir. Parece que ellos tienen más confianza en nuestra capacidad para resolver nuestros problemas que nosotros mismos”.

Solía decirse que cuando los Estados Unidos estornudaban, al resto del mundo le daba pulmonía. Más recientemente, muchos sostenían que con el crecimiento de China y los Estados petroleros, una desaceleración en los Estados Unidos estaría desconectada del resto del mundo. Pero cuando a Estados Unidos le dio la gripe financiera, otros se contagiaron. Muchos líderes extranjeros pasaron pronto del regocijo burlón al miedo – y a la seguridad de los bonos de la tesorería estadounidense.

Las crisis a menudo refutan la sabiduría popular, y ésta ha revelado que el poderío subyacente de la economía estadounidense sigue siendo impresionante. El mal desempeño de Wall Street y las instancias de reglamentación de los Estados Unidos le han costado al país mucho en términos del poder blando derivado del atractivo de su modelo económico, pero el golpe no tiene por qué ser mortal si, a diferencia de Japón en los años noventa, los Estados Unidos logran absorber las pérdidas y limitar los daños. El Foro Económico Mundial sigue calificando a la economía estadounidense como la más competitiva del mundo debido a la flexibilidad de su mercado laboral, su educación superior, su estabilidad política y su apertura a las innovaciones.

La pregunta más amplia tiene que ver con el futuro a largo plazo del poder de los Estados Unidos. Un nuevo pronóstico para 2025 preparado por el Consejo de Seguridad Nacional estadounidense prevé que el dominio de ese país estará “muy mermado” y que una esfera clave de su superioridad continua –el poder militar—será menos significativa en el mundo competitivo del futuro. No se trata tanto del debilitamiento de los Estados Unidos sino más bien del “crecimiento de los demás”.

El poder siempre depende del contexto y en el mundo de hoy, se distribuye en un patrón que se asemeja a un complejo juego de ajedrez tridimensional. En el tablero de arriba, el poder militar es en gran medida unipolar y es probable que así siga siendo durante un tiempo. Pero en el tablero de en medio, el poder económico ya es multipolar, con los Estados Unidos, Europa, Japón y China como jugadores principales y otros que van cobrando importancia.

El tablero de abajo es el ámbito de las relaciones transnacionales que cruzan fronteras fuera del control del gobierno. Incluye actores tan distintos como los banqueros que transfieren electrónicamente cantidades mayores que gran parte de los presupuestos nacionales, así como terroristas que transfieren armas o hackers que interfieren en las operaciones de Internet. También comprende los nuevos retos como las pandemias y el cambio climático. En este tablero inferior, el poder está muy disperso y no tiene sentido hablar de unipolaridad, multipolaridad o hegemonía.

Incluso después de la crisis financiera es probable que el ritmo vertiginoso del cambio tecnológico siga impulsando la globalización, pero los efectos políticos serán diferentes para el mundo de los Estados nación y para el mundo de los actores no estatales. En la política inter-Estados, el factor más importante seguirá siendo la continua “vuelta de Asia”.

En 1750, Asia contaba con las tres quintas partes de la población y de la producción económica mundiales. Para 1900, tras la revolución industrial de Europa y los Estados Unidos, Asia representaba únicamente una quinta parte de la producción mundial. Para 2040, Asia habrá avanzado mucho para recuperar su participación histórica.

El crecimiento de China y la India podría crear inestabilidad, pero ese es un problema con precedentes y podemos aprender de la historia sobre la forma en que las políticas pueden afectar el resultado. Hace un siglo, Inglaterra manejó el crecimiento del poder de los Estados Unidos sin conflictos, pero el fracaso del mundo para manejar el crecimiento del poder alemán condujo a dos guerras mundiales devastadoras.

También será necesario manejar el crecimiento de los actores no estatales. En 2001, un grupo sin Estado mató a más estadounidenses que el gobierno de Japón en Pearl Harbor. Una pandemia propagada por aves o viajeros en aviones podría matar a más personas de las que murieron en las dos guerras mundiales. Los problemas planteados por la difusión del poder (que se aleja de los Estados) tal vez resulten más difíciles que los cambios en la distribución del poder entre Estados.

El desafío para Barack Obama es que cada vez más problemas están fuera del control incluso del Estado más poderoso. Si bien los Estados Unidos dominan las medidas tradicionales de poder, esas medidas son cada vez menos adecuadas para gran parte de lo que define la política mundial, que, debido a la revolución de la información y la globalización, está cambiando de tal forma que impide a los estadounidenses alcanzar todas sus metas internacionales por sí solos.

Por ejemplo, la estabilidad financiera internacional es vital para la prosperidad de los Estados Unidos, pero ese país necesita la cooperación de otros para asegurarla. El cambio climático global también afectará la calidad de vida, pero los Estados Unidos no pueden manejar el problema de manera aislada. Y, en un mundo donde las fronteras son cada vez más porosas a las drogas, las enfermedades contagiosas y el terrorismo, los Estados Unidos deben movilizar coaliciones internacionales para atacar las amenazas y retos compartidos.

Con su calidad de economía más grande del mundo, el liderazgo de los Estados Unidos seguirá siendo crucial. El problema del poder de los Estados Unidos tras la crisis financiera no es de debilitamiento sino de tomar conciencia de que ni siquiera el país más poderoso puede alcanzar sus metas sin ayuda de los demás. Afortunadamente Barack Obama lo entiende.

Joseph S. Nye Jr., ex Secretario Asistente de la Defensa de los Estados Unidos,  es profesor en la Universidad de Harvard y autor de The Powers to Lead.

http://www.project-syndicate.org/commentary/nye63/Spanish

Bush e a Índia

La India disiente de la Obamanía

by Pramit Pal Chaudhuri

NUEVA DELHI – La India es uno de los pocos países, la mayoría concentrados en Asia y África, en los que el sentimiento a favor de los Estados Unidos aumentó, en realidad, durante el gobierno de George W. Bush. Aun así, hubo más indios a favor de la elección de Barack Obama que de la de John McCain. ¿Cómo se puede explicar esa aparente contradicción?

En el fondo del éxito del gobierno de Bush en la India estaba la creencia de que este país era una nación cuyo ascenso era beneficioso para los intereses de los Estados Unidos, lo que movió a Bush a procurar ajustar el orden internacional en provecho de la India, muy en particular negociando una exención del Tratado de No Proliferación Nuclear para la India. El resultado claro fue una relación indoamericana más estrecha y una opinión positiva sobre Bush que prevaleció sobre acciones impopulares, como, por ejemplo, la invasión del Iraq.

La elección de Obama –el éxito de un miembro de una minoría no blanca en la democracia más antigua del mundo– ha cautivado la imaginación de muchos indios. Lo jalean los medios de comunicación y las clases intelectuales. Entre los partidarios más fervientes de Obama en los EE.UU. ha figurado la comunidad indoamericana, compuesta por casi tres millones de personas. Según dijo un asesor de Obama, “no se puede dar un paso en el bando de Obama sin pisar un pie a un indoamericano”.

Antes de las elecciones, muchos indios no podían creer que un afroamericano fuera a ser elegido jamás para residir en la Casa Blanca. Su elección ha aumentado –como era inevitable– el prestigio de los EE.UU. como tierra de auténticas oportunidades, una nación cuyos credenciales multiculturales son tan grandes –si no más– como los de la poliglota y poliétnica India.

El mayor escepticismo sobre una presidencia de Obama corresponde a la minoría estratégica india, centrada en la promoción de los intereses económicos y políticos de la India en el mundo entero, que encontró un aliado en pro de esa causa en Bush. Sean cuales fueren las credenciales étnicas de Obama, el gobierno de la India ha advertido en sus declaraciones motivos para creer que no lo apoyará tanto como Bush.

En primer lugar, la India recela que  el gobierno demócrata incluirá a los mismos partidarios de la no proliferación nuclear que se opusieron a la exención propuesta por Bush. Obama ha dicho públicamente que se propone hacer lo posible por conseguir un tratado de prohibición completa de los ensayos nucleares, al que la India se opone, porque su capacidad de disuasión nuclear sigue siendo incompleta.

En segundo lugar, Obama ha atacado la contratación externa de servicios en lugares como la India y la relocalización de empleos manufactureros a Asia en conjunto. Además, sus asesores indican que procurarán incorporar disposiciones sociales, como las normas laborales, a las futuras negociaciones comerciales internacionales. Aunque los candidatos suelen dar marcha atrás de sus posiciones proteccionistas, una vez que llegan al poder, el control por los demócratas de las dos cámaras del Congreso puede que no deje ese margen a Obama.

En tercer lugar, se ha dicho que un gobierno demócrata situará el cambio climático en una posición prominente de su política mundial. Si se centra en mitigar la producción de carbono con medios tecnológicos, no habrá grandes motivos de preocupación. Sin embargo, si la  política se inclina por medidas más coercitivas, como, por ejemplo, la aplicación de aranceles al carbono y similares, es probable que el resultado sea la conversión del cambio climático en una lucha por la seguridad energética. Además, enfrentará a los grandes emisores de carbono del futuro, la India y China, con contaminadores actuales como los EE.UU. y Europa.

Por último, las conversaciones con algunos asesores de Obama y sus discursos indican que en los próximos años la preocupación principal de Washington en materia de seguridad serán el Afganistán y el Pakistán. “El del Iraq es un problema del pasado”, dijo un asesor a un auditorio indio hace unas semanas.

Según los asesores de Obama, la esencia del problema es la neurosis en aumento del régimen pakistaní. El Pakistán padece una guerra intestina y es propenso a ver conspiraciones contra él por parte de prácticamente todos sus vecinos y con frecuencia de los EE.UU. En este momento, una importante preocupación en este último país es la de disipar esos temores. Un elemento de esa política sosegadora, según ha dicho repetidas veces Obama y la más reciente ha sido en una entrevista televisiva, es el de “intentar resolver la crisis de Cachemira para que, en lugar de en la India, [el Pakistán] se centre en la situación de esos militantes”.

Se trata de un objetivo sensato y los dirigentes de la India reconocerán que redundaría en su provecho, pero cualquier proceso de paz sobre Cachemira que se vea como consecuencia de la presión de los EE.UU. estará políticamente muerto al llegar a la India. Cachemira es un campo de minas diplomático. Un paso equivocado al respecto podría dar como resultado una congelación de las relaciones indoamericanas durante años.

En última instancia, existen indicios de que el nuevo gobierno de Obama procurará restablecer un status quo internacional anterior a la presidencia de Bush: entre otras cosas, restablecer los lazos con Europa, reforzar el régimen de no proliferación nuclear y posiblemente devolver a China el carácter de eje de la política de los EE.UU. en Asia. En ese caso, la cuestión para la India será la de si con ello se reduce el espacio internacional que el país obtuvo con Bush.

En ese caso, es muy probable que un sector en el que el gobierno de Obama no conseguirá avanzar será en el de la intensificación de la relación indoamericana, aparte de la esfera estrictamente económica.

Pramit Pal Chaudhuri es jefe de redacción del Hindustan Times y miembro del Consejo Internacional de la Asia Society.

http://www.project-syndicate.org/commentary/chaudhuri3/Spanish

É o fim do neoliberalismo?

Já se velou muito difunto que "ressuscitou" quando o caixão estava baixando, então ainda não é hora de acendermos vela para o neoliberalismo. O neoliberalismo é mau difunto, especialmente porque só o conhecemos pelo apelido. O que a esquerda chama de neoliberalismo é um fantasma criado pelos próprios críticos que jogam dentro de um mesmo rótulo uma série de idéias que nem sempre pertencem ao mesmo universo teórico e intelectual. Há uma riqueza teórica no interior do "neoliberalismo" que passa despercebido aos críticos. Atacar uma série de bobagens ditas por Milton Friedman é fácil, atacar o autoritarismo do Hayek  também, entretanto as concepções ortodoxas da economia são amplas e variadas. Antes do difunto ser enterrado é conveniente manter a atenção para ver se não será apenas uma mudança na corrente hegemônica no interior da própria economia ortodoxa.

E às vezes o que parece diferente não é senão outra forma de apresentação do mesmo conteúdo. Os setores reformistas, a esquerda não-revolucionária estabeleceu um caso de amor com Stiglitz. Entretanto o Stiglitz pelo qual eles se apaixonaram não existe, ou melhor, existe apenas no discurso político. O universo teórico de Joseph Stiglitz  é o da economia neoclássica. Stiglitz não é um keynesiano de fato, é keynesiano apenas dentro do universo da economia neoclássica das expectativas racionais. Ou seja, reconhece que há alguns entraves no mercado que impedem que o mercado funcione como previsto pela teoria dos novos clássicos. Mas daí a ser keynesiano no sentido que será keynesiano nos 1950, 1960 ou no sentido dos pós-keynesianos, ou mesmo ser um heterodoxo qualquer que seja o sentido do termo há uma longa distância. A teoria do Stiglitz não fundamenta um novo mundo, apenas melhora a maquilagem do velho mundo. E aí que mora o perigo, é bastante provável que as principais propostas de reforma do sistema ao invés de resolver o problema sirvam apenas para encobri-lo.

Do ponto de vista das relações internacionais também não se deve ter muitas esperanças no fim do neoliberalismo porque esta é uma crise sui generis, é uma crise sem vencedores. E quando não há vencedores gera-se uma indefinição sobre o princípio que irá fundamentar a reorganização do sistema porque ninguém é capaz de impor o seu e a disperidade de interesses impede a formação de um consenso na ausência de hegemonia clara. Por exemplo, na crise atual, uma solução séria para crise envolveria uma redefinição da posição do dólar na economia mundial e uma imposição de uma reorganização do setor externo norte-americano. Mas quem acredita que isso irá ocorrer? Quem imporá isso aos EUA? E que presidente norte-americano proporá uma reforma que implique uma perda de improtância do dólar na economia mundial?