Rivalidade entre China e Japão

Japan is ignored
Source: Global Times
[08:11 January 28 2011]

Illustration: Liu Rui

http://opinion.globaltimes.cn/cartoon/2011-01/617806.html

Japão deve temer a China?

Editorial

Japan's illusionary sense of fear

• Source: Global Times

The successful flight of the J-20 stealth fighter has sparked concern among China's neighboring countries. Japan seems to be the most worried. It is reported that Japan is discussing importing the American F-35 jet fighter, as well as buying Russian fifth-generation jets. This build-up is aimed at the J-20.

Every step of China's military growth seems to unnerve Japan more than it does the US. This is understandable given the geographic proximity of China and Japan. But does Japan's fear of China's rise make sense?

That China remains less powerful than Japan seems to be the endgame here.  Otherwise, Japan would not feel any unease. It cannot accept China's military spending growth, it is unwilling to see China's fleet breaking through neighboring island chains. China's plans to build aircraft carriers and to fly the J-20 compounds this unhappiness.

But will China adjust its long-chosen military plan because of this worry? China has a population 10 times larger than Japan's. China's growth cannot be decided by the will of Japan. Japan has to gradually accept a stronger China and ponder the future of northeast Asia based on that reality.

The "China threat" is imaginary: Japan has benefited from China's rise. Japan is clear that the way China is dealing with Asian countries is different from its own militaristic past.  Japan had invaded other countries when it was a rising power. Does the fact give it reason to infer China will follow the same route? China's military growth is not targeting Japan. Japanese society must understand this. The competition between the two countries has to be rational and pragmatic.

China, aiming at having more open land and sea territory, is encouraged by the J-20. Japan's worry demonstrates that it is overly guarding against China.

The illusionary sense of crisis will not make Japan feel any better. Perhaps it should take a look at the cultural relics looted from China now on display in the Tokyo museums. China didn't harm Japan in history. Why would it do so in future?

http://opinion.globaltimes.cn/editorial/2011-01/614472.html

Ascensão chinesa, estagnação japonesa

Es probable que nos rebase esta economía, dice Japón

Viernes 21 de enero de 2011 El Universal

El ministro japonés de Finanzas, Kaoru Yosano, consideró “probable” que la economía de China supere a la de su país como la segunda a nivel mundial por su tamaño, una vez que se conozcan los datos de 2010.

Dada la información conocida ayer, “pienso que es probable que China supere a Japón en cuanto al tamaño de su economía”, dijo el ministro nombrado apenas el pasado viernes en la segunda restructucación del actual gobierno japonés.

La Oficina Nacional de Estadísticas de China informó este jueves que en 2010 el valor del Producto Interno Bruto (PIB) del país sumó 6.05 billones de dólares, con un crecimiento anual de 10.3%.

El dato del crecimiento chino, basado en el esfuerzo de su pueblo y gobierno, merece reconocimiento, y es un logro que puede beneficiar a la economía japonesa, añadió Yosano de acuerdo a un despacho de la agencia Kyodo.

Datos del Banco Mundial (BM) para 2009 indican que el PIB estadunidense sumó 14.1 billones de dólares (bdd), el de Japón 5.06 bdd y el de China 4.98 bdd, mientra el alemán se ubicó en cuarto lugar con 3.3 bdd, seguido del francés con 2.6 bdd.

Una vez que se conozcan los datos de la economía japonesa y se confirme que su economía perdió el segundo lugar mundial en cuanto a tamaño, se marcará el fin de una era para Japón, que ocupó esa posición desde 1968, señaló la agencia Kyodo.

La tercera posición la podría perder hacia 2028 a manos de India, de acuerdo al reporte de PricewaterhouseCoopers liberado la semana pasada, agregó.

Japón enfrenta inestabilidad política y problemas estructurales como persistente deflación, crecimiento de la deuda pública y rápido envejecimiento de su población.

Varios análisis apuntan a que China ocupará el primer lugar desplazando a Estados Unidos dentro de 20 años, el más simbólico movimiento en el traspaso del poder económico global del mundo desarrollado hacia las economías emergentes, cerró el comentario.

La economía del gigante asíatico se está moviendo a pasos gigantes, con crecimiento anuales superiores al 9% en promedio. (Notimex)

http://www.eluniversal.com.mx/finanzas/84143.html

Estratégia de Defesa Japonesa preocupada com a China

Defense strategy says China's rise is a 'concern'

2010/12/18

A new 10-year defense plan approved by the Cabinet on Friday describes China's burgeoning military power as a "matter of concern" for other countries in East Asia, and calls for more mobile and flexible Self-Defense Forces to respond to the new threats facing Japan.

The National Defense Program Guidelines document maps out Japan's grand strategy for the 2010s and is the first such strategy to be penned by a Democratic Party of Japan-led government.

It calls the military emergence of China as a "matter of concern both for the region and the international community" and, despite the DPJ's oft-repeated criticism of previous Liberal Democratic Party administrations for following the United States, it places greater emphasis on the U.S. alliance than its predecessors.

The Kan Cabinet also approved the Mid-Term Defense Program, a projection of defense spending over the next five years, on Friday.

In that period, total defense spending is estimated at 23.49 trillion yen ($276 billion). Average annual defense spending is expected to increase by about 0.1 percent, compared with the fiscal 2010 budget. The 2005-2009 Mid-Term Defense Program saw cuts in annual defense spending.

The new strategy emphasizes "dynamic defense capabilities" that stress mobility and rapid response by the Self-Defense Forces. It also calls for strengthening of the defense of the Nansei island chain that lies off the south of Kyushu and extends to close to Taiwan. Both are clear reflections of concerns about China's emerging military presence in the region. The disputed Senkaku Islands, which were the focus of a spat with China in September, are in the Nansei region.

The guidelines propose increasing the deployment of submarines in the area and the use of surveillance units to keep an eye on shipping in the area.

In April, a total of 10 Chinese naval vessels moved through waters that separate the main Okinawa island from Miyakojima island as part of a maritime military exercise that extended from the East China Sea to the Pacific Ocean. A Maritime SDF destroyer monitored the exercise from a distance of 4,000 to 5,000 meters.

Ship-based helicopters on two occasions veered dangerously close to the destroyer. On one occasion, a helicopter hovered about 90 meters horizontally and at a height of 30 meters.

After that incident, the governments of Japan and China resumed discussions to establish a maritime communications system to avoid accidents between the MSDF and the Chinese navy in the East China Sea.

However, one high-ranking Defense Ministry official expressed doubts that an agreement can be reached.

"The Chinese want to place restrictions on Japan's surveillance because they consider it a bother," the official said. "On the other hand, the United States does not want any restrictions on Japan."

China's increasing assertiveness is also the primary reason the guidelines call for a comprehensive review of the "Basic Defense Force Concept," which long served as the cornerstone of Japan's defense policy.

A key element of that concept was an even and uniform deployment of the SDF across Japan's territory, but the shift to the south of Japan's defense focus and the emphasis on rapid deployment may force a rethink.

The guidelines talk about units being deployed away from their assigned bases to respond to terrorists and to defend outlying islands. These passages appear to be referring not only to North Korea, which continues with nuclear weapon and ballistic missile development, but also Beijing, which has rapidly expanded its activities in the East China Sea and South China Sea.

The focus on China partly reflects the policy of the United States. In the Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) released by the U.S. Defense Department in February, concerns were raised about how China's increasing military capabilities were threatening the projection of U.S. power in the western Pacific.

The United States could be prevented from operating in the region if China's submarines expanded their activities in the Pacific or if China developed anti-ship ballistic missiles that could hit aircraft carriers.

To achieve closer cooperation with the United States, the guidelines call for greater cooperation in ballistic missile defense, joint military training exercises and joint surveillance activities.

But the guidelines also state that the influence of the United States is changing relative to the growing power of nations such as China, India and Russia, and indicate that Japan will have to shoulder more of a defense burden.

The guidelines also call for greater cooperation with Australia and South Korea, two other American allies.

The new strategy does not, however, deliver the review of Japan's ban of weapons exports for which Washington has long been asking.

The guidelines do state that a major trend among advanced nations is international joint development and production of weapons because of the higher costs and functions of the most advanced weapons, and call for discussion about how to respond to the trends. But there is no attempt to reverse the ban.

A statement was released under the name of Chief Cabinet Secretary Yoshito Sengoku Friday saying that the government would continue to abide by the three principles on weapons exports.

The statement also called for the compilation of a medium- and long-term strategy to maintain and bolster defense production and technology.

China on Friday blasted Japan for singling out Beijing in its new defense guidelines and raising concerns about its emerging military presence.

Chinese Foreign Ministry spokeswoman Jiang Yu said in a statement, "An individual nation has no right to make irresponsible statements about China's development, acting as though it represents the international community."

There has been strong interest in China about the new defense guidelines, with one Chinese expert on Japan urging caution against worsening friction between the two nations.

Jiang added, "China's national defense policy is for defensive purposes only, and China has no intention of becoming a threat to anyone."

One reason for the criticism by Beijing is that U.S. strategy toward China is reflected in the defense guidelines. The QDR focused on China's military strategy in the western Pacific, and the proposals in the defense guidelines about strengthening the defense of the Nansei island chain are influenced by the QDR.

* * *

Gist of the new National Defense Program Guidelines

- North Korea's military movements are a major element of instability. The modernization of China's military power and strengthening of its capabilities are matters of concern for the region and the international community.

- Highly mobile forces capable of rapid deployment should be developed.

- Cold War-era weapons and personnel deployments should be phased out. Surveillance, maritime patrol, air defense and ballistic missile defense capabilities should be improved.

- Units should be deployed to outlying islands where there is now no presence.

- Defenses against cyber attacks should be strengthened

- A unit in the prime minister's office to coordinate policy among Cabinet ministers and to provide advice to the prime minister should be set up.

- Measures to avoid friction due to U.S. military bases in Japan should be introduced.

- Japan should debate how to deal with the trend toward the multinational development and production of weapons.

Negociações entre China e Japão sobre guerra Sino-Japonesa entre 1937-1945

Japan admits war 'act of aggression'

By Li Xiaokun (China Daily)
Updated: 2010-02-02 08:35

Joint history study breaks new ground, but differences remain

Japan admitted in a long-awaited report from the joint history study with China on Sunday that the 1937-1945 Sino-Japanese war was an "act of aggression", but the two neighbors are still at odds on a number of issues, such as the death toll of the 1937 Nanjing Massacre.

Bu Ping, Chinese chief commissioner of the joint research, told China Daily yesterday that, despite the divergence, the report carries great importance for improving mutual understanding, especially as it is just the first of such joint studies,

"I hope subsequent studies will lead to a history textbook in the future that is jointly endorsed by the governments of China, Japan and the Republic of Korea," said Bu, director of the Institute of Modern History of the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences (CASS).

In the report Japan used the word "aggression" to refer to the 1937-1945 war for the first time, breaking Tokyo's long-standing reluctance to use it.

Japan's Kyodo news agency said the move ruled out China's long-term concerns that some people in Japan are denying the nation's responsibility and even the fact that it conducted a war of aggression.

The war "left a deep scar on China that was the battleground, and we have to say that most of the causes were created by the Japanese side," said the report.

But despite this deep divisions still remain.

On the number of Chinese killed by the Japanese army after it seized Nanjing - the then Chinese capital - Chinese academics said the number was more than 300,000, based on the ruling of the 1947 Nanjing War Crimes Tribunal.

The Japanese side, however, noted "various estimates up to 200,000, such as 40,000 and 20,000" exist in Japanese studies.

Both sides refrained from asserting a definitive figure.

The research panel member Sumio Hatano, a professor at the University of Tsukuba in Ibaraki Prefecture, told Kyodo there has been no accepted figure because of differences in "the verification of data", notably in terms of the definition of "massacre", the area and period in which the incident took place, burial records, and other sources.

But they agreed that "mass killings" of prisoners of war, civilians, stragglers and other people did occur, along with rapes, looting and arson.

Japan also avoids mentioning germ warfare Unit 731 although China refers to it by name.

Ishii Akira, a professor on East Asia studies with Tokyo University, told Kyodo there would be no conclusion on the death toll of the Nanjing Massacre unless a massive investigation is launched. But Japan should not have ignored the victims of the 731 Unit, he said.

Among other points the two sides disagree on is whether Japan was affiliated to China from ancient to medieval times. However, both sides did agree "the nation of Japan was born from the culture of the (Chinese) continent".

The two governments endorsed the research project in 2006 to improve mutual understanding.

The release of the 530-page report, covering ancient, medieval and modern history, marked the end of the project. A second stage is scheduled to begin soon.

"This is the first step for the two countries to deepen mutual trust. I hope the media, and citizens, can see the positive significance of improving mutual trust," said Bu Ping.

He also said the focus on the Nanjing Massacre is not the death toll but the nature.

Bu has expected many emotional comments on the report but said he would just care about remarks from experts.

"I want to emphasize that the academic disputes are different from gaps between the two countries," he said.

Zhang Baijia, deputy director of the Communist Party of China History Research Center, said the report is a good example of "seeking common ground while reserving differences on minor ones" between China and Japan.

Japanese Foreign Minister Katsuya Okada yesterday welcomed the report, saying, "even if there may have been differences in views I think common understanding can gradually be nurtured by working on it."

Chief Cabinet Secretary of Japan Hirofumi Hirano said yesterday the divergence would not have a negative impact on China-Japan relations.

"History is just history. The government will work for the future," he said.

Tokyo University's Akira Ishii said he was encouraged to notice that in the report China wrote about Japan's efforts to strive for peace at that time.

Kyodo said yesterday the way Germany and France erased their distrust after the war is a positive example for Japan to develop its relations with China, Russia and the Republic of Korea.

Peru, o país dos TLC 2

Interés. Términos serán más ventajosos que aquellos incluidos en acuerdos con Chile y México
Japón asegura que TLC con el Perú será el más óptimo
- Primer ministro de ese país asiático hizo ofrecimiento
- Ministro de Comercio Exterior da detalles sobre buena disposición nipona
DENISse COLLANTES TENORIO
El primer ministro japonés, Yukio Hatoyama, aseguró que el Acuerdo de Asociación Económica que negocia su gobierno con el Perú tendrá mejores condiciones que los que fueron suscritos anteriormente con países latinoamericanos, informó el titular de Comercio Exterior y Turismo peruano, Martín Pérez.
“Durante la reciente reunión que sostuvo el presidente de la República, Alan García, él confirmó y se comprometió a que este acuerdo comercial tenga iguales o mejores términos que los tratados que tiene con Chile y México”, informó el funcionario.
La autoridad japonesa comentó que si había algún tema estancado en las negociaciones bilaterales, había que tomar la iniciativa política correspondiente para resolver este problema, declaró.
“Hatoyama ya está dando una instrucción precisa a los negociadores japoneses para destrabar el proceso”, dijo desde Singapur, donde participa en la decimosétima Reunión de Líderes del Foro de Cooperación Económica Asia Pacífico.
Ambos países iniciaron a mediados de este año las conversaciones para lograr un acuerdo comercial. La Cuarta Ronda de Negociaciones se llevó a cabo la primera semana de octubre en Tokio.
El acuerdo contempla un Acuerdo de Libre Comercio para facilitar el intercambio bilateral, que en 2008 alcanzó aproximadamente tres mil millones de dólares.
“El objetivo del Gobierno peruano es un buen acuerdo comercial, que tenga las mejores condiciones para el país, y lo estamos logrando. Si firmamos un acuerdo no es para mantener el comercio actual, sino para desarrollar el potencial que tenemos”, manifestó Pérez.
El ministro destacó que en las negociaciones, desde un primer momento, Japón haya brindado al Perú más beneficios que a sus competidores de la región, sobre todo en términos sanitarios y acceso al mercado.
“Por eso, es importante una visita de alto nivel, como la que recientemente hizo el presidente Alan García a Japón, porque la posición política manda sobre la de los negociadores, que están calculando nada más cuánto pueden ceder o no.”
Diálogo con Estados Unidos
El Perú y Estados Unidos sostendrán una reunión bilateral para hacer un balance del proceso de implementación del tratado de libre comercio bilateral que entró en vigencia en febrero.
El ministro Martín Pérez informó que se reunirá con el secretario de Comercio estadounidense, Gary Locke, para evaluar cómo va dicho proceso.
étratar es el del avance en la elaboración del proyecto de la Ley Forestal y de Fauna Silvestre, que reemplazará al Decreto Legislativo N° 1090, derogado por el Congreso.

http://www.elperuano.com.pe/edc/2009/11/14/pol1.asp

Japão cansado da presença militar norte-americana

November 14, 2009

Obama, in Japan, Says U.S. Will Study Status of a Marine Base on Okinawa

By HELENE COOPER and MARTIN FACKLER

TOKYO — President Obama, seeking to mend fences with Japan, America’s most important Asian ally, announced Friday that he would establish a high-level working group on the contentious issue of the continuing presence of a Marine base on Okinawa.

The decision, announced at a news conference with Prime Minister Yukio Hatoyama just hours after he touched down in Tokyo to begin his first presidential trip to Asia, appears to represent a concession by the Obama administration to at least consider Japan’s concerns about the base, which is unpopular on Okinawa and which the new Japanese government had promised to try to move off the island.

Less than a month ago, Defense Secretary Robert M. Gates seemed to shut the door on renegotiating a deal reached in 2006 to relocate the United States Marine air station in Futenma to a less populated part of Okinawa.

Mr. Obama was, in effect, making a political gift to Mr. Hatoyama: seeming to reopen a door Mr. Gates had shut, even though Japan policy experts indicated that the establishment of the working group was most likely only a face-saving way for the new prime minister to show the Japanese public that he was keeping a campaign promise.

Mr. Obama’s visit comes at a time when relationships between the two allies have hit their lowest point in years and Mr. Hatoyama searches for a more “equal partnership.” On Friday, both leaders emphasized the importance of the relationship, and stressed that the two sides were seeing eye to eye.

Standing beside Mr. Obama at the Japanese equivalent of the White House, the Kantei, Mr. Hatoyama said, “We’ve come to call each other Barack and Yukio, and gotten quite accustomed to calling each other by our names.”

White House officials said that the United States had agreed only to talks “on the implementation” of the 2006 Okinawa agreement, and said they did not expect to alter the larger shape of the agreement, which also calls for relocating about 8,000 Marines to Guam.

“It is a fact that we did campaign on this issue, and the Okinawans do have high expectations,” Mr. Hatoyama said, explaining why he was intent on reopening the subject.

The United States also appeared to give ground on the other security point of dispute, accepting Mr. Hatoyama’s pledge of $5 billion in aid to Afghanistan, which the prime minister linked to his government’s decision to end the Japanese Navy’s refueling mission near Afghanistan.

Mr. Obama said the promise “underscores Japan’s prominent role” in the international effort in Afghanistan.

Still, there have been ample signs that the half-century alliance may be entering a new phase. Recently, squabbles between the United States and Japan have focused mostly on trade disputes over luxury cars and semiconductors, while the security alliance between the two remained stable.

Now, the conflicts have shifted to security, more specifically, on the Marine bases on Okinawa, the southern island that is home to about two-thirds of the 37,000 shore-based United States military personnel in Japan. Okinawans have said that they shoulder a disproportionate burden, and simmering resentments erupted in 1995 after the rape of a 12-year-old schoolgirl by three American servicemen.

In 2006 the United States agreed to rebase thousands of soldiers to Guam, and to move the Marine base at Futenma elsewhere on Okinawa. But Mr. Hatoyama campaigned for office on a pledge to move the airfield off Okinawa altogether.

Political analysts and the Japanese news media now speak of a communication gap opening between Washington and Tokyo, which has led to what they call excessive American concerns that Japan may try to alter the two nations’ postwar military alliance.

These analysts say that the two nations are actually much closer on bilateral issues than they realize, and that Japan cannot afford to alienate a protector upon whom it still relies for its security as it faces a fast-rising China and a nuclear-armed North Korea. But they say relations have fallen into a vicious cycle in which Tokyo sends conflicting signals, and Washington makes matters worse by raising public pressure.

Yasunori Sone, a professor of political and policy analysis at Keio University in Tokyo, said of the Japanese leaders: “There are too many places where we don’t know what the new government really wants. Their public relations has been poor.”

At the same time, the experts also blame the Obama administration for overreacting to what they say is essentially language aimed at a domestic audience and for failing to see that Tokyo’s government has little stomach for big changes to the alliance.

Japanese officials, in Washington last month to prepare for Mr. Obama’s trip, asked their American counterparts and foreign policy experts to give the new Japanese government time to get its house in order.

The American frustration over the Hatoyama government’s refusal to back down from the campaign pledges on the Okinawa base came to a head when Mr. Gates visited Tokyo in October. Mr. Gates, known for speaking bluntly, pressed Mr. Hatoyama and Japanese military officials to keep their commitment on the military agreements.

“It’s time to move on,” Mr. Gates said, calling Japanese proposals to reopen the base issue “counterproductive.” Then, adding insult to injury in the eyes of Japanese commentators, Mr. Gates turned down invitations to attend a welcoming ceremony at the Defense Ministry and to dine with officials there.

Mr. Obama will try to make up for some of the ensuing upset. On his agenda Friday night: dinner with Mr. Hatoyama.

O que fazer com a Coréia 3

1. A primeira coisa a esclarecer é que a questão nuclear norte-coreana não decorre de um suposto risco da Coréia realizar um ataque nuclear. Está suficientemente consolidada na literatura de relações internacionais a idéia que um país não realiza ataque nuclear na medida em que terá uma resposta também nuclear de igual intensidade. No caso da Coréia do Norte caso realizasse um ataque nuclear receberia uma resposta também nuclear ao qual não teria a menor condição de responder. Em termos nucleares, a Coréia do Norte só tem poder, enquanto não usar as armas nucleares, ao utilizá-las ela seria derrotada. A Coréia do Norte tem muito mais vantagens num ataque militar terrestre à Coréia do Sul do que numa guerra nuclear. Então, a questão central na discussão sobre o caso norte-coreano não deve ser um “virtual” ataque nuclear.

2. A segunda questão é qual o objetivo norte-coreano. Qualquer governo autoritário, que apenas se mantém no poder pela força, precisa se mostrar forte para a população e mais importante precisa de inimigos e de demonstrar capacidade de enfrentar o inimigo. Então o desenvolvimento nuclear norte-coreano permite intimidar a população, mostrar a força e a potência do governo e unir uma população miserável em torno de um objetivo comum, a defesa do Estado. A população está se sacrificando por algo muito importante, a segurança do país, e este sacrifício está valendo a pena. Este é um aspecto. Outro aspecto, o Estado norte-coreano é um Estado militarizado. O Exército norte-coreano possui mais 1 milhão de soldados numa população em torno de 24 milhões de habitantes. Apenas a título de comparação no Brasil, com uma população infinitamente maior, o exército não tenha mais de 300 mil homens. A Coréia do Sul com o dobro da população norte-coreana possui um exército menor. Ou seja, o peso dos militares na Coréia do Norte é enorme, portanto, o apoio deles ao governo é indispensável. A militarização, a mobilização para guerra passam a ser questões políticas internas necessárias para a estabilidade interna. Dependente do exército, o governo norte-coreano tem pouco espaço para desmobilizar a sociedade e realizar negociações internacionais. Ou seja, se para o governo, o desenvolvimento nuclear pode ser apenas instrumento para chantagear a comunidade internacional, para os militares é assunto sério. Não pode ser simplesmente descartado em troca de pequenos favores econômicos.

3. A situação norte-coreana mostra também os limites das instituições internacionais na questão nuclear. É ingenuidade crer que não haverá proliferação nuclear em virtude um tratado internacional. E na medida em que um país desobedece o tratado, os problemas se avolumam e a desmoralização das instituições passam a ocorrer de forma sistemática. Na medida em que um país se recusa a participar do regime de não-proliferação o que se pode fazer? Inclusive porque o regime de não-proliferação contesta um princípio basilar das relações internacionais, a igualdade entre os Estados.

4. Outro aspecto da questão é, como reagir? Primeiro, os EUA. NO curto prazo, qualquer reação dos EUA será considerada inofensiva. O que os EUA podem fazer que tenha eficácia na contenção da Coréia do Norte? Os EUA poderiam imitar o ataque preventivo de Israel ao Irã na década de 80, bombardear as bases nucleares coreanas. Mas os EUA tem condições de fazer isso? Não, primeiro porque já está em duas guerras. Segundo, porque são várias bases, o ataque seria de grandes proporções, não seria um ataque cirúrgico, localizado. Terceiro, ao contrário do Irã que naquele momento estava fraco, a Coréia do Norte tem uma grande capacidade de retaliação. Uma vez atacada, a Coréia do Norte responderia bombardeando Seul, e mesmo o Japão. Então os EUA, de fato, não podem fazer nada, exceto buscar isolar ainda mais a Coréia do Norte, o que é contra-produtivo, apenas estimula ainda mais o sentimento nacional norte-coreano. Diante desta situação de impotência norte-americana, a reação da Coréia do Sul e do Japão será uma maior militarização desses países. De fato, o desenvolvimento nuclear da Coréia do Norte deve gerar como reação um novo surto de corrida armamentista no setor nuclear. Coréia do Sul e Japão irão pleitear alcançar o status de potência nuclear, e os EUA não terão condições de negar na medida em que não é capaz de conter eficazmente a Coréia do Norte.

5. No Iraque, os EUA tentaram assassinar várias vezes Sadam Hussein, o mesmo fez em Cuba com Fidel Castro. Até o momento a CIA não se mostrou eficaz das principais lideranças, consegue matar os assessores, os escalões inferiores, mas não as cúpulas. Num país fechado e vigiado como a Coréia do Norte, a capacidade de CIA agir é menor ainda. Muito difícil colocar espiões num país onde estrangeiros não circulam, com população etnicamente homogênea  e em pânico, ou seja, o espião teria que ser um nacional, mas cooptação não seria fácil. Evidência disso é que a CIA não previu a ameaça coreana ao contrário do Iraque, onde era fácil realizar a infiltração (mas neste caso foi vencida pelos desvios ideológicos e pela ignorância).

6. Sendo assim, a perspectiva de mudança na Coréia do Norte é interna. A única possibilidade é a desagregação da Coréia do Norte com a morte de Kim Jong-il. O presidente está doente e está cuidando da sua sucessão, quer transmitir o poder para um dos seus filhos. Pelo que saiu na imprensa, o filho escolhido teria 25 anos e seria considerado muito novo para os padrões coreanos, não seria aceito. Então teria inicialmente um tio assumiria o poder como tutor até que o sobrinho pudesse assumir. Se estes fatos se confirmarem estará abertas as portas para mudanças na Coréia do Norte, porque nada mais propenso para gerar transformações do que disputas sucessórias ainda mais quando há tutor. Aumenta a possibilidade conflitos, briga-se para ser o tutor, briga-se para destituir o tutor, para ser o herdeiro, para o herdeiro assumir logo. Então a esperança mundial recai novamente na esperança da morte do presidente norte-coreano. Da primeira vez não deu certo, o filho foi pior que o pai.

Japão: entre o keynesianismo e a via chinesa

Japão: entre o keynesianismo e a via chinesa

Escrito por Corival Alves do Carmo

01-Abr-2009

Em duas décadas o Japão passou da mais dinâmica economia capitalista, de modelo de desenvolvimento econômico comandado pelo Estado para a principal vítima da dinâmica financeira contemporânea. A década de 90 foi aberta com a crise financeira pesando sobre as principais economias desenvolvidas, desvalorizações cambiais.

Os ataques especulativos contra a lira italiana e a libra inglesa fizeram a fama de George Soros. Mas na medida em que se avançou na década de 1990, os EUA e a Europa conseguiram estabilizar as suas economias, a União Européia retomando inclusive o processo de integração monetária. A grande exceção foi o Japão.

As crises financeiras do início da década de 1990 deixaram a economia japonesa bastante combalida. Os bancos japoneses precisaram de receber forte apoio do governo. O Japão entrou numa situação de dilema de liquidez. Muitos recursos disponíveis, taxa de juros reais negativa a maior parte do tempo, baixo crescimento econômico, e ineficácia dos pacotes de estímulo da economia introduzidos pelo governo. O Japão consolidou-se na liderança mundial em relação ao déficit público, resultando num endividamento público crescente. A dívida pública japonesa representou 153% do PIB em 2008.

A economia japonesa se arrastou durante toda a década de 90 iniciando uma tímida recuperação apenas nos anos 2000, e ainda assim cresceu sempre abaixo da média das economias desenvolvidas. Além dos efeitos do baixo crescimento econômico interno, o Japão sofreu as conseqüências do deslocamento da sua economia pela China. A crescente importância da China como fornecedor de bens para os EUA, a integração da China com as economias do sudeste asiático, tudo isso significou uma reordenação da posição do Japão na economia mundial. Ou seja, a economia japonesa já se encontrava fragilizada antes mesmo da crise do subprime norte-americano se difundir por toda a economia mundial.
No último trimestre de 2008 o PIB caiu mais de 12% em comparação com o último trimestre de 2007. Comparado ao trimestre anterior a queda no PIB no último trimestre de 2008 foi de 3,2%. A pior retração da economia desde o choque do petróleo em 1973. Em 2008, o PIB japonês já acumulou uma baixa de 0,6% e as expectativas não são melhores para 2009.

Continua em:

http://revistaautor.com/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=420&Itemid=38

Nisso o liberal abaixo está certo, em 2o anos a política econômica japonesa não funcionou, mas se tivesse adotado o neoliberalismo não teria sido pior?

Charles Philbrook
Japón: El Sol Naciente y su muy keynesiana puesta de sol

30 de marzo de 2009 

Hasta hace poco, muy poco, el consenso en cuanto a qué hacer en torno a la crisis económica global era, se podría decir, casi general, y eso, en cierta forma, reflejaba el "Ahora todos somos keynesianos". En los últimos días, sin embargo, en una reunión de ministros de Finanzas de la Unión Europea, llevada a cabo en Bruselas, éstos acordaron romper con las implicancias de pareja afirmación; es decir: no más paquetes de estímulo fiscal, pues un mayor nivel de deuda pública "amenazaría la estabilidad de la eurozona" ("Europe rejects extra stimulus appeal", Financial Times, 9 de marzo de 2009).
Esta decisión trasciende lo político, y abre una gran brecha económica en el Atlántico, entre los estadounidenses, dispuestos a correr el riesgo de la destrucción monetaria y bancarrota fiscal, y los europeos, decididos a salvar lo que queda de su Unión.

¿Irresponsabilidad o prudencia europea? ¿Cómo resumir el acuerdo de Bruselas? Como uno de cordura en lo fiscal y locura en lo monetario (se sigue permitiendo que el Banco Central Europeo continúe con su bacanal de deuda y crédito). Con más de lo mismo, con más de Keynes, la desintegración monetaria era un hecho: tres países —Alemania, Austria y Holanda— son ahorristas netos (producen más de lo que consumen), mientras que los demás consumen más de lo que producen.
Un mayor déficit en la eurozona, entonces, sólo es posible si estos tres están dispuestos a financiar un creciente dispendio, lo que deja de ser una opción ahora que la producción industrial alemana entra en caída libre. Por lo tanto, es más que obvio que la respuesta desde las trincheras teutonas tuvo que haber sido un amenazante y rotundo "No".

Gastar más, consumir más, endeudarse más, buscando salvar a la economía de la depresión a la que un creciente nivel de gasto, consumo y deuda la han llevado, va en contra del sentido común y de toda lógica económica. Japón lo sabe bien, y ahora Europa también.

El Gobierno del Sol Naciente ya lleva casi veinte años intentando infructuosamente resucitar su moribunda economía, luego del colapso financiero e inmobiliario al que, indirectamente, el Acuerdo del Plaza, en 1985, condujo. Tal acuerdo, se recordará, buscaba que el dólar se deprecie, principalmente, en relación al yen japonés, y así, en teoría, cerrar el creciente déficit comercial norteamericano. El yen, entonces, se apreció, lo que afectó negativamente al sector exportador, reduciendo a la mitad el crecimiento económico del año siguiente.
Esto llevó a que el Banco de Japón optara por una política monetaria expansiva, que a comienzos de 1987 reducía a la mitad, a 2,5%, la tasa interbancaria. Con el costo del crédito por los suelos, y como es "natural", una creciente especulación terminó por inflar los precios de los activos financieros y de los bienes inmuebles. En 1985, el índice del mercado de valores, el Nikkei 225, fluctuaba alrededor de los 11.000 puntos, mientras que el índice de precios del sector de bienes raíces comerciales, en las seis ciudades más grandes, lo hacía alrededor de los 150. Cinco años más tarde, y gracias a la generosidad de la política monetaria expansiva del Banco de Japón, estos índices se disparaban verticalmente más de 230%.

Toda burbuja especulativa acaba mal: o revienta, si el banco central reduce súbita y drásticamente la liquidez, o pierde aire en forma gradual. En uno y otro caso se destruye la ilusión de prosperidad a la que una artificial expansión del dinero y del crédito condujo. Pues bien, ya que el Banco de Japón estaba al tanto de la inexistencia de una tercera alternativa, optó por que ésta pierda aire en forma gradual, y elevó la tasa interbancaria cinco veces, de 2,5% en 1987 a 8% en 1991.
Este encarecimiento del crédito, como era de esperar, acabó con la especulación en los mercados, y desde el punto máximo alcanzado en 1990, uno y otro índice aquí mencionado pierde ya un 80% de su valor. Y si a estos índices les va mal, a la economía en su conjunto no le va menos mal: el PBI real, en la década de los noventa, ha crecido a una tasa promedio anual de 0,9%, la que ha pasado a ser negativa desde 1998.

En lo fiscal y monetario no se puede acusar a Japón de no haberlo intentado todo. Redujo progresivamente su tasa interbancaria, de 8% en 1991 a prácticamente cero por ciento desde 1995, y aun así, lo inestable de los "signos vitales de la economía" lleva a que la prognosis oscile entre mala e inútil (de nada sirve que el costo del crédito sea cero si el retorno promedio a las inversiones—utilizando el PBI real como una aproximación— es negativo: ¡no se invierte para perder!).
En la misma línea, ya son diez —¡sí, diez!— los paquetes de expansión fiscal que se aprueban desde el colapso de la burbuja, y los resultados son aun más desastrosos: la deuda pública, como porcentaje del PBI, se ubicaba en un 60% en 1991, y hoy es del orden de 180% (escapa toda comprensión posible que haya economistas que afirmen que el Gobierno japonés no hizo todo lo que pudo, o que lo hizo tarde; ignoran que toda herramienta es útil en la medida que se emplea de la forma prevista).

Pues bien, ¿qué explica el fracaso del experimento keynesiano? Esto: una economía moderna tiene dos grandes sectores: el público y el privado. Todo proceso de creación de riqueza se da únicamente en el sector privado, y la demostración de que sólo puede ser así, parte de la siguiente observación: sin los ingresos fiscales, el Gobierno colapsa; sin el pago de impuestos, el ciudadano tiene para consumir y ahorrar más. Un mayor gasto fiscal, entonces, implica una redistribución del consumo, de uno a otro sector, del privado al público.
Bien, ¿qué argumento podría justificar esta redistribución? Algunos economistas postulan que una "recesión" más que la justifica. Pero ¿qué sabemos acerca del origen de ésta? ¿Es de origen interno o externo? Si es de origen interno no tiene sentido que el Gobierno suba los impuestos o se endeude internamente buscando aumentar el ingreso nacional, pues así como nuestra riqueza personal no aumenta cuando pasamos el dinero de un bolsillo a otro, ésta tampoco lo hace cuando los recursos de un país fluyen de un sector al otro (el mágico y prodigioso "multiplicador" no es más que una función algebraica sin aplicación alguna en la vida real, como así lo demuestra la experiencia japonesa).
Ahora bien, que el Gobierno se endeude externamente, en otra moneda, sólo tiene sentido si se cumplen estas dos condiciones: (1) el total de la deuda se invierte (no se canaliza a un mayor consumo), y (2) la rentabilidad futura de las obras en infraestructura alcanza para cubrir los intereses de la deuda, el pago del principal y posibles variaciones (en contra) del tipo de cambio (que el Gobierno se vea obligado a refinanciar su deuda, cada cierto tiempo, podría indicar que estas dos condiciones nunca estuvieron presentes, en cuyo caso pueden sumarle una razón más al porqué de la pobreza en un país).

De Japón sabemos que su recesión es interna (el colapso de su burbuja, de sus excesos fiscales, monetarios), y también sabemos que hizo todo aquello que no debió hacer. ¿Por qué sorprendernos, pues, por los infortunios que afligen a su atribulada economía? "Los placeres sensoriales", decía la columnista estadounidense Ann Landers, "tienen el resplandor efímero de un cometa; un matrimonio feliz, la tranquilidad de una hermosa puesta de sol". ¿Y qué diría de los "placeres keynesianos"?

http://www.eldiarioexterior.com/noticia.asp?idarticulo=28956

O capital se faz em casa, mas se gasta no exterior!

Barbosa Lima Sobrinho escreveu um livro chamado "Japão: o capital se faz em casa". Era para mostrar como o Japão crescia a partir da poupança interna, da acumulação interna, e é verdade. Mas a acumulação interna é tanta que falta oportunidades de investimentos. Aí primeiro tivemos o ciclo da década de 1980 onde o Japão saiu às compras nos EUA e no mundo. Agora segundo a The Economist, o Japão voltou às compras aproveitando a desvalorização no valor das empresas. Obviamente é preciso esperar a comodação da economia mundial para se avaliar o processo, mas é interessante. De fato, quem deveria aproveitar a oportunidade para se internacionalizar de forma mais acelerada é a China.

E vejam que se este processo de fusão e incoporação transnacional for uma característica deste período de crise, a crise contribuirá para aprofundar ainda mais a integração e não para a "desglobalização".

Japão não ama os emergentes! Mas o Japão tem poder?

G-8 expansion worries Tokyo

BY SUSUMU MAEJIMA, STAFF WRITER

2008/7/2

This is the first in a series on the G-8 summit in Hokkaido that starts Monday.

If French President Nicolas Sarkozy puts Japanese government officials on edge during next week's Group of Eight summit, it will probably have little to do with his wife, singer and former model Carla Bruni, grabbing the media spotlight.

A more likely cause of concern for the host nation at Lake Toyako, Hokkaido, is Sarkozy's proposal to include China, India and other emerging economies in the G-8 framework.

As Japan is the only G-8 member from Asia, officials apparently fear that such a development would dilute Tokyo's influence within the exclusive club.

"At the G-8 summit, we must produce concrete results, rather than merely discuss issues," Sarkozy told Prime Minister Yasuo Fukuda in Rome on June 3. "We have to increase the number of member countries if we are to respond to changes going on around the world."

Fukuda made it clear he did not agree and that Japan would support the current setup.

"The summit offers a valuable and meaningful opportunity for a limited number of leaders who assume great responsibilities for international society to frankly exchange opinions," he was quoted as saying.

"It is important to hold dialogue with emerging economies in dealing with global challenges. We will have an 'outreach' meeting with these countries at Lake Toyako."

Sarkozy, who took office in May 2007, has advocated a "G-13" framework, which would include China, India, Brazil, Mexico and South Africa.

His initiative comes at a time when G-8 countries are struggling to show meaningful leadership on climate change and soaring energy and food prices.

International efforts to curb global warming will not pay off without the involvement of China, India and other emerging economies, where strong demand has helped send worldwide energy and food prices skyrocketing.

In a written interview with The Asahi Shimbun, Sarkozy's foreign minister, Bernard Kouchner, said, "We have to share responsibilities with emerging economies, rather than simply holding dialogue with them."

British Prime Minister Gordon Brown has also backed a G-8 expansion.

In a speech in New Delhi in January, he said that the G-8, the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund should be restructured to reflect the growing influence of India and other Asian countries.

Japan is reluctant to expand the G-8, a move that could undermine its key diplomatic position as the only Asian member.

It is also seeking a permanent seat on the U.N. Security Council, where four of the five positions are held by fellow G-8 members.

"The (summit process) started as a gathering of mature, advanced democracies and has maintained its fundamental principles," Chief Cabinet Secretary Nobutaka Machimura told a news conference last week.

"The member countries will decide, by consensus, which countries are qualified to join the grouping, after taking its origin and background into account."

A senior Foreign Ministry official in charge of preparations for the summit said he did not expect G-8 leaders to discuss expansion at Lake Toyako.

"There will be some leaders who say whatever they want at news conferences after the summit is closed," the official said, when asked about the possibility of Sarkozy's proposal being put on the table. "But I'm afraid that leaders will not have time to discuss the issue during the summit because they have a long list of pressing issues before them."

The summit process was launched in 1975, when leaders from Japan, the United States, Britain, France, West Germany and Italy gathered at the Chateau de Rambouillet in suburban Paris to discuss the global economy, following the 1973 oil crisis.

Canada joined the following year, and Russia was officially admitted from the 1997 summit in Denver because Western countries wanted to back its transition to democracy and a market economy.

In recent years, G-8 countries have tried to embrace the rise of emerging economies by inviting several countries for informal discussions on the sidelines of their annual summits.

The five countries on Sarkozy's list have regularly participated in these "outreach" meetings since the 2005 summit in Gleneagles, Scotland.

But guest countries are not involved in months-long preparations by senior government officials, and their views are not included, at least directly, in the joint communique released after the summit.(IHT/Asahi: July 2,2008)

http://www.asahi.com/english/Herald-asahi/TKY200807010515.html

FAO espera que Japão lidere a solução para a crise alimentar. Produzindo mais alimentos? Não, com dinheiro.

FAO eyes long-term plan for food crisis

05/17/2008

BY TARO KARASAKI, STAFF WRITER

Japan should take the lead in enhancing food production in developing countries, instead of simply extending emergency relief to alleviate the global food shortage, the head of the U.N. Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) said Friday.

FAO Director-General Jacques Diouf told a news conference in Tokyo that he hopes Japan, as chair of the Group of Eight summit in July and the Fourth Tokyo International Conference on African Development later this month in Yokohama, will push for long-term solutions to the food crisis.

Diouf was in Tokyo for three days from Wednesday to exchange views with Japanese officials, including Prime Minister Yasuo Fukuda.

The FAO is seeking $1.7 billion (178 billion yen) from donor countries to enhance agriculture, Diouf said, adding that he hopes Japan will urge other industrialized countries to contribute more.

"In addition to assistance to face the present crisis..., there is a need to focus on food production," he said. "We hope to reverse the current trend" of declining assistance for agriculture.

Diouf conveyed a similar message when he met with Fukuda on Thursday. He said that he and Fukuda agreed on the need to address the issue of food production, and that Tokyo should take the initiative.

Diouf said aside from an overall decline in official development assistance from industrialized countries such as Japan, the share of assistance for agriculture production has dropped from 17 percent in 1980 to 3 percent in 2005.

He said priority should be given on devoting resources to promoting irrigation, improving storage facilities, as well as buying seeds and fertilizers, to prevent a future food crisis.

While stopping short of openly criticizing the diversion of crops from human consumption use to production of biofuels, Diouf identified the trend as a factor behind the food shortage, along with unusual weather patterns caused by climate change, increasing demand from fast-growing economies, such as China and India, and export restrictions by crop-producing countries.

He said those matters will be discussed extensively at a high-level international conference on food security that the FAO will host in Rome in early June. Fukuda is considering attending the event.

Japan has said the food crisis will be a key issue at the G-8 summit at Lake Toyako, Hokkaido, and is planning to offer more than $100 million in emergency aid ahead of the summit to alleviate the food crisis.

According to the FAO, more than 35 countries face food crises stemming largely from rising prices of grains. The food shortages have led to bloody riots and demonstrations in many developing countries.(IHT/Asahi: May 17,2008)

Até o Japão tem medo de crescer dependendo das exportações!

Exports again push up GDP growth

05/17/2008

THE ASAHI SHIMBUN

Japan's economy grew at a faster-than-expected pace during the January-March quarter, but uncertainty over the future also increased because the country remains heavily dependent on exports, analysts said Friday.

According to preliminary estimates released by the Cabinet Office on Friday, gross domestic product during the first quarter of this year rose by a seasonally adjusted 0.8 percent, or an annualized 3.3 percent, from the previous quarter in real terms.

Real GDP grew for the third straight quarter, supported by brisk exports to emerging economies and the European Union, which more than offset the decline in exports to the United States.

Overall exports of goods and services jumped by 4.5 percent, and net exports, or external demand, accounted for 0.5 percentage point of the 0.8-percent growth.

Private consumption, which accounts for more than 50 percent of real GDP, grew by 0.8 percent in the first quarter.

Although its growth rate was larger than the 0.4-percent increase in the October-December quarter of 2007, consumer spending was still too weak to drive overall economic growth.

Many private-sector think tanks are forecasting a decrease in summer bonuses for the second straight year-on-year decline.

In addition, private-sector investment in plants and equipment, which had spearheaded GDP growth along with exports, shrank by 0.9 percent during the January-March period, the first contraction since the April-June quarter of 2007.

Private-sector housing investment, which had plunged amid tightened regulations under the revised Building Standards Law, increased by 4.6 percent, the first growth in five quarters.

Overall, domestic demand contributed 0.3-percentage point to the 0.8-percent growth.

"Although domestic demand modestly contributed to the GDP growth, external demand played a larger role," a senior official of the Cabinet Office said.

It is unclear if the domestic economy can continue to grow after renewing a postwar record of uninterrupted expansion, given the noticeable slowdown in the U.S. economy since early this year, analysts said.

If the U.S. economy slips into recession, exports from emerging economies to the U.S. market will decline, potentially affecting Japan's exports to those countries.

The contraction in corporate investment in plants and equipment was caused by the sharp deterioration in business confidence amid soaring prices of crude oil and raw materials and the appreciation of the yen.

Such investment could shrink further.

Real GDP for all of fiscal 2007 rose by 1.5 percent from a year earlier, exceeding the government's forecast of 1.3 percent, but falling below the 2-percent level for the first time in five years.

GDP on a nominal basis increased by 0.6 percent in fiscal 2007, short of the government projection of 0.8 percent.

The nominal growth rate was lower than the real growth rate for the 10th straight year, underlining the deflationary trend.

During the January-March period, nominal GDP inched up 0.4 percent, or an annualized 1.5 percent, from the previous quarter.

The GDP deflator, which measures broader changes in commodity prices, fell by 1.4 percent from a year earlier, due partly to the stronger yen, which trimmed the yen-denominated value of exports.(IHT/Asahi: May 17,2008)

http://www.asahi.com/english/Herald-asahi/TKY200805170074.html

O perigo não é os EUA se aproximarem da China e esquecerem o Japão, é o Japão se aproximar da China. Aos EUA interessam o conflito entre a China e o Japão!

El futuro de la alianza entre los Estados Unidos y el Japón

by Joseph S. Nye

Cambridge – Muchos analistas advierten actualmente un malestar en el Japón en relación con su alianza con los Estados Unidos. Tiene que ver en parte con las armas nucleares de Corea del Norte y la preocupación por que los EE.UU. no defiendan adecuadamente los intereses del Japón (como, por ejemplo, pedir cuentas sobre el caso de los ciudadanos japoneses raptados por Corea del Norte hace años.) Otras cuestiones se refieren a la base de infantería de marina de Okinawa y el reparto de los costos del traslado de parte de sus efectivos a Guam. Se trata de una lista larga, pero la mejor forma de concebir esas cuestiones es la de considerarlas “domésticas”: no son pocas las parejas que pueden discutir sobre ellas sin pensar en divorciarse.

Sin embargo, existe un nivel más profundo de descontento, relacionado con el temor del Japón a quedar marginado a medida que los EE.UU. se vuelven hacia una China en ascenso. Por ejemplo, algunos japoneses se quejan de que China recibe mucha más atención que el Japón en la campaña electoral americana. Semejante ansiedad no es de extrañar: las capacidades de defensa americanas y japonesas no son simétricas, lo que ha de inquietar por fuerza a la parte más dependiente.

A lo largo de los años, se han hecho diversas propuestas con vistas a volver mas simétrica la alianza, incluida la conversión del Japón en un país “normal” con toda una panoplia de capacidades militares, incluidas las armas nucleares, pero semejantes medidas plantearían más problemas de los que resolverían. Aun cuando el Japón las aplicara, seguirían sin igualar la capacidad de los EE.UU. ni eliminar la asimetría. Vale la pena observar que durante la Guerra Fría los aliados europeos de los Estados Unidos, pese a sus capacidades militares, tuvieron preocupaciones similares sobre su dependencia y posible abandono.

La verdadera garantía de la decisión americana de defender al Japón es la presencia de las tropas y las bases de los EE.UU. y la cooperación en materia de asuntos –como, por ejemplo, la defensa mediante cohetes balísticos– encaminados a proteger a la vez a los americanos y a los japoneses. Además, hay dos respuestas válidas a la pregunta de si los EE.UU. abandonarían al Japón a favor de China: relativas a los valores y la amenaza.

El Japón y los EE.UU. son, a diferencia de China, democracias los dos y comparten muchos valores. Además, tanto el Japón como los EE.UU. afrontan un desafío común por parte del ascenso de China y tienen un profundo interés en que no llegue a ser una amenaza. Los EE.UU. consideran que una relación triangular Japón-China-EE.UU. es la base de la estabilidad en el Asia oriental y desean que existan buenas relaciones entre los tres países, pero no se trata de un triángulo equilátero, porque los EE.UU. están aliados con el Japón y, si mantienen su alianza, China no tiene por qué llegar a ser una amenaza para ninguno de esos dos países.

Por otra parte, no se debe exagerar la potencia de China. Una reciente encuesta de opinión indica que un tercio de los americanos creen que China “pronto dominará el mundo”, mientras que el 54 por ciento considera su ascenso una “amenaza para la paz mundial”. No cabe duda de que, calculada mediante los tipos de cambio oficiales, China es la cuarta economía mundial y está creciendo a un ritmo del 10 por ciento anual, pero la renta por habitante de China representa sólo el 4 por ciento de la de los EE.UU. Si las economías de los dos países siguen creciendo a sus tasas actuales, la de China podría ser mayor que la de los Estados Unidos dentro de treinta años, pero la renta por habitante de los EE.UU. seguirá siendo cuatro veces mayor. Además, la de China esta muy rezagada en potencia militar y carece de los recursos de “poder blando” de los Estados Unidos, como, por ejemplo, Hollywood y las universidades de talla mundial.

También la evolución interior de China sigue siendo incierta. Desde 1990, ha sacado a cuatrocientos millones de personas de la pobreza, pero otros 400 millones viven con menos de dos dólares al día. Junto con una inmensa desigualdad, China tiene una mano de obra migrante de 140 millones de personas, una grave contaminación y una corrupción galopante. Además, su evolución política no ha ido a la par con su progreso económico. Si bien más chinos son libres hoy que nunca en su historia, China dista mucho de ser libre. El peligro es que los dirigentes del Partido, al intentar contrarrestar la erosión del comunismo, recurran al nacionalismo para que sirva de nexo de cohesión, lo que podría propiciar una política exterior inestable… incluido, por ejemplo, un conflicto con Taiwán.

Frente a semejante incertidumbre, una política sensata ha de combinar el realismo con el liberalismo. Reforzando su alianza, los EE.UU. y el Japón pueden protegerse contra la incertidumbre y al tiempo ofrecer a China la integración en las instituciones mundiales como “copartícipe responsable”. El mayor peligro es el de que una intensificación del miedo a la enemistad en los tres países se convierta en una profecía destinada a cumplirse inexorablemente. A ese respecto, la alianza entre los Estados Unidos y el Japón se basa en intereses conjuntos muy profundos.

Sin embargo, existe una nueva dimensión de la alianza y de la relación con China. Este año, China superó a los EE.UU. como mayor emisora del mundo de los gases que provocan el efecto de invernadero. China sostiene, con razón, que sigue detrás de los EE.UU. y del Japón en emisiones por habitante, pero eso no reduce los costos impuestos al mundo (incluidos los EE.UU. y el Japón). Un programa de cooperación que ayude a China a quemar su carbón de forma más limpia interesa a los tres países.

En general, las amenazas transnacionales, como, por ejemplo, el cambio climático o las pandemias, pueden causar daños equivalentes a un conflicto militar. (En 1918, la gripe aviar mató a más personas que la primera guerra mundial). Para afrontar dichas amenazas es necesaria la cooperación, el poder blando e instrumentos no militares y ése es un sector en el que el Japón es un aliado mucho más igual e importante. Si acaso, la nueva dimensión en aumento de las amenazas transnacionales, si se suma a las preocupaciones tradicionales por la seguridad, hace que el futuro de la alianza entre el Japón y los Estados Unidos parezca más prometedor que nunca.

Joseph S. Nye, ex Subsecretario de Defensa de los Estados Unidos, es profesor en la Universidad de Harvard y su libro más reciente es The Powers to Lead (“Las capacidades para dirigir”).

E se a moda pega no Brasil, não vai sobrar igreja!

Unification Church agrees to pay 230 million yen to former follower

04/08/2008

THE ASAHI SHIMBUN

The Unification Church, apparently fearing the wrath of the education ministry, agreed to pay 230 million yen ($2.2 million) to a woman who said she was intimidated into donating huge sums to the group.

The woman, 70, from Chiba Prefecture, had demanded about 260 million yen, claiming the group pushed her to make contributions by saying "the reason her husband died of an illness was because of his fate caused by ancestors' actions."

The sum is a record for an out-of-court settlement involving the Unification Church and an individual, according to the National Network of Lawyers Against the Spiritual Sales.

The Unification Church is a religious group founded in South Korea by Reverend Sun Myung Moon and is known for its mass wedding ceremonies.

In out-of-court settlement talks, representatives of the Unification Church initially offered 130 million yen to the woman.

But they added about 100 million yen to the sum after the woman threatened to pursue the responsibility of the education ministry, which oversees religious corporations, including the Unification Church.

Hiroshi Yamaguchi, a lawyer with the network against spiritual sales, speculated that the Unification Church upped the settlement out of fear of the ministry.

"The Unification Church must be hoping to avoid a possible suspension and other punitive measures," he said.

The woman first sent a notice to the group demanding compensation in August 2006, according to Masaki Kito, a lawyer representing the woman.

Not satisfied with the group's initial offer, the woman's side sent out another letter, saying the education ministry was also responsible for failing to force the Unification Church to make a sincere response to her claim.

An accompanying draft complaint showed that the Ministry of Education, Culture, Sports, Science and Technology was also listed as a defendant in the woman's planned compensation lawsuit.

Representatives of the group then offered to pay about 220 million yen to settle the matter. Last month, they raised the amount to more than 230 million yen and started making payments.

The religious corporation law states that the education ministry can order a religious corporation to suspend operations or it can file a request with a court to seek the disbandment of the group.

Kito said the ministry should still take remedial measures in line with that law, noting that the Supreme Court acknowledged in 1997 the illegality of the Unification Church's spiritual sales.

An official of the Unification Church declined to comment on the matter. "We refrain from commenting because it involves the privacy of our followers," the official said.

In July last year, the Tokyo High Court ordered the Unification Church to pay 276.2 million yen to a 69-year-old woman who said she was threatened and forced to make contributions.

It was the largest amount ordered by a court against the Unification Church. (IHT/Asahi: April 8,2008)

É ético matar baleias?

¿Hipocresía en alta mar?

by Peter Singer

Hace treinta años, los buques australianos, con el consentimiento del gobierno, mataban cachalotes en la costa occidental australiana. El mes pasado, Australia encabezó las protestas internacionales contra el plan de Japón de matar 50 ballenas jorobadas. Japón, bajo una presión creciente, anunció que suspendería el plan por uno o dos años. El cambio en la opinión pública sobre la caza de ballenas ha sido dramático, y no sólo en Australia.

Greenpeace inició las protestas contra Australia por la caza de ballenas, y el gobierno nombró a Sydney Frost, un juez jubilado, para que dirigiera una investigación sobre dicha práctica. Como australiano preocupado y profesor de filosofía que trabaja sobre la ética del trato que damos a los animales, presenté una ponencia.

No aduje que la caza de ballenas debía terminar porque las ballenas estuvieran en peligro. Yo sabía que muchos expertos en temas ecológicos y biólogos marinos presentarían ese argumento. En cambio, sostuve que las ballenas son mamíferos sociales con cerebros grandes, con capacidad de disfrutar de la vida y sentir dolor –no sólo dolor físico sino también, muy probablemente, angustia por la pérdida de un miembro de su grupo.

No es posible matar a las ballenas de forma compasiva –son demasiado grandes e incluso con un arpón explosivo es difícil alcanzar a la ballena en el sitio adecuado. Además, los cazadores de ballenas no desean utilizar muchos explosivos porque así se despedazaría el cuerpo del animal y el objetivo principal es recuperar el aceite valioso o la carne. Por ello, las ballenas con heridas de arpón normalmente mueren poco a poco y con mucho dolor.

No es correcto causar dolor a seres inocentes sin que haya una razón de mucho peso para hacerlo. Si hubiera una cuestión de vida o muerte que los humanos sólo pudieran resolver matando ballenas, tal vez los reparos éticos podrían contrarrestarse. Pero no hay ninguna necesidad humana esencial que nos obligue a matar ballenas, Todo lo que extraemos de las ballenas podemos obtenerlo sin crueldad de otras formas. Por ello la caza de ballenas no es ética.

Frost coincidió conmigo. Dijo que los métodos utilizados para matar a las ballenas eran, sin lugar a dudas, inhumanos –incluso los describió como “extremadamente horribles”. También mencionó “la posibilidad real de que estemos tratando con una criatura que tiene un cerebro extraordinariamente desarrollado y un alto grado de inteligencia”. El gobierno conservador del Primer Ministro Malcolm Fraser aceptó su recomendación de suspender la caza de ballenas, y poco después Australia se convirtió en un país en contra de esa actividad.

Si bien Japón ha suspendido su proyecto de matar ballenas jorobadas, su flota ballenera aún cazará otro millar de otras ballenas, principalmente los rorcuales, más pequeños. Japón justifica la caza afirmando que es con fines de “investigación” ya que las normas de la Comisión Ballenera Internacional permiten a los países miembros matar ballenas con ese propósito. Pero parece que la investigación tiene como objetivo buscar bases científicas para reanudar la caza comercial; por ello, si la caza de ballenas no es ética, entonces la investigación en sí misma no es ni ética ni necesaria.

Japón pide que la discusión sobre la caza de ballenas se desarrolle de forma tranquila, con base en evidencias científicas, “objetivamente”. Los japoneses piensan que la cantidad de ballenas jorobadas ha crecido lo suficiente para poder cazar 50 ejemplares sin que ello suponga un riesgo a la especie. Es posible que tengan razón en este punto aislado. Pero los datos científicos, por numerosos que sean, no pueden guiar nuestra decisión de matar ballenas o no.

En efecto, el deseo de Japón de seguir cazando ballenas es igual de subjetivo que el de los ambientalistas que se oponen a ello. Comer ballenas no es necesario para la salud o una mejor nutrición de los japoneses. Es una tradición que desean mantener porque presumiblemente tienen un apego emocional a esa práctica.

Los japoneses cuentan con un argumento que no se puede desestimar fácilmente. Sostienen que los países occidentales se oponen a la caza de ballenas porque las consideran un animal especial, como los hindúes a las vacas. Los países occidentales, señalan los japoneses, no deberían tratar de imponerles sus creencias culturales.

La mejor respuesta a este argumento es que considerar incorrecto el causar sufrimiento innecesario a seres que sienten no es exclusivo de una cultura. Por ejemplo, ese es uno de los primeros preceptos de una de las tradiciones éticas más importantes de Japón: el Budismo.

Pero los países occidentales están en una posición débil para presentar esa respuesta porque infligen mucho sufrimiento innecesario a los animales. El gobierno australiano se opone firmemente a la caza de ballenas, y sin embargo permite que se maten millones de canguros cada año –una matanza que implica grandes sufrimientos para los animales. Se puede decir lo mismo de las varias formas de cacería que se practican en otros países, por no mencionar el gran sufrimiento que padecen los animales en las granjas industriales.

Se debe interrumpir la caza de ballenas porque provoca sufrimiento innecesario a animales sociales, inteligentes y capaces de disfrutar de sus vidas. Pero los países occidentales no podrán defenderse de la acusación de sesgo cultural que les hace Japón mientras no aborden el sufrimiento animal innecesario en sus propios patios traseros.

Peter Singer, profesor de bioética en la Universidad de Princeton, es autor del libro pionero Animal Liberation y, junto con Jim Mason, de The Ethics of What We Eat.

http://www.project-syndicate.org/commentary/singer32/Spanish

EUA e Japão

Clinton diz qua a parceria entre o Japão e os EUA são vitais para as gerações futuras, será? A virada na economia do governo Clinton ocorreu no mesmo momento que ele conseguiu vencer o Japão. O Japão que já esava em crise, continuou em crise, e quando parece estar saindo da crise está saindo ligado à China e não aos EUA. Para o Japão a única parceria que interessa hoje é militar. Por incrível que pareça, hoje do ponto de vista econômico os EUA são passado para o Japão e continuará sendo assim se a China conseguir se consolidar como potência econômica. Como já disse outras vezes, não sei se acredito na China.