India’s security expansion not targeted at China

India’s security expansion not targeted at China

Global Times | April 23, 2012 19:45
By Global Times

India has just successfully tested the 5,000-kilometer-range Agni-V missile, further strengthening its security.
In early April, the Indian Defence Minister A.K. Anthony commissioned the Russian origin 8,000-ton Akula II-class nuclear-powered attack submarine, the INS Chakra, in eastern port of Visakhapatnam. This was leased from Russia at a cost of about $1 billion and is meant to patrol the seas, and track and hunt enemy submarines in wartime and be used for surveillance in peacetime.
These two pieces of news, plus a Stockholm International Peace Research Institute report in March saying that India is now the world's largest arms importer, have made many, especially Chinese military analysts, worry that India is sending a strong deterrent signal to China.
Some observers are saying that the Agni-V missile can have Beijing within its reach and is designed to send a strong deterrent signal to China. But since both countries follow a No First Use nuclear doctrine, if China does not use nuclear weapons against India, then the Agni-V will not be used by India against China in a nuclear war. In the past four strategic dialogues at the foreign secretary level between India and China, India brought out proposals for "de-targeting." It does not want to target China with nuclear warheads.
Purely from a military perspective, India's commission of nuclear-powered attack submarine is not aimed at China either. The submarine will carry Klub-class cruise missiles and not nuclear missiles. Hence it is not meant to add strategic deterrence to the Indian Navy. As India, like China, follows No First Use, the counter-strike or second strike response needs to be robust and credible.
Let's then look at India's arms purchasing, which is gaining lots of attention. With sales to India now accounting for 10 percent of all arms purchases during the past five years, there are views that India's "military modernization" comes through buying and renting weapons from other countries, and is aimed at resisting China's rise.
It is true that India is recently able to purchase a lot of conventional weapons from several countries. While China is the target of an arms embargo by the US and Europe, they have no problems selling to India.
However, due to corruption scandals or delays in procurement, India was unable to close many arms deals in the 1980s or 1990s, and several were delayed. That's why the recent purchases by India appear to be overwhelming.
India also spends less on indigenous research and development compared to China. To enhance its indigenous capabilities, India has recently been insisting on either local joint design or license manufacturing agreements with prospective arms sellers. India has also cancelled several arms purchases from the US or other countries.
Western media has been hyping of the military confrontation between China and India. This mentality has much clout. The Western media does not see Indian military modernization as part of occupying and expanding territories, while in the case of China, its military modernization is seen as expanding its territorial claims. The recent controversy about the South China Sea islands is a case in point.
In the foreseeable future, Sino-Indian relations will not be severely troubled. While there are differences between India and China on a number of issues, both are also engaged in mutually beneficial cooperation and participation in multilateral forums.
There will not be a conventional or nuclear war between the two countries. As both are nuclear powers, it is difficult to imagine a war between the two, and both are very clear that escalation from one level to the other can be very difficult to predict. India and China have lots of common interests. The two should understand the mainstream in their ties, and should not be over-influenced by either Western instigation or excessive speculations.
This article was compiled by Global Times reporter Wang Wenwen based on an interview with Srikanth Kondapalli, a professor from School of International Studies at Jawaharlal Nehru University.wangwenwen@globaltimes.com.cn

http://www.globaltimes.cn/NEWS/tabid/99/ID/706244/Indias-security-expansion-not-targeted-at-China.aspx

Future of Indian pharma lies beyond generics

Future of Indian pharma lies beyond generics

Ajay Dsouza

The Indian pharmaceutical industry's emergence on the global landscape as a strong generics player was due, in no small measure, to the Indian Patents Act, 1970, which allowed only process patents in pharmaceutical products. This was aimed at keeping the cost of medicines at affordable levels by enabling domestic pharma players to build technical expertise in reverse engineering of existing medicines by modifying the manufacturing process and, thus, become efficient producers of generic drugs.

Although India shifted to the product patent regime in 2005, the capabilities developed during the past two decades became a competitive advantage for the Indian pharma industry in the 1990s, when the rising healthcare costs in many developed countries forced them to seek the cheaper generic drug option. Thus, the Indian pharma industry was able to exploit the enormous generic opportunity that was spawned.

The share of Indian pharma companies in the total pie of approvals for generic drugs (called abbreviated new drug applications (ANDA) approvals in the U.S.) has risen steadily. In 2011 itself, more than a third of the ANDA approvals were by Indian firms. As a consequence, formulation exports from India, essentially generic drugs, have grown at 21 per cent compounded annual growth rate (CAGR) between 2005-06 and 2010-11. With about $150 billion worth of drugs set to lose patent exclusivity between 2010 and 2015, Crisil Research expects the growth momentum in exports to continue over the next five years, with exports growing at 14-16 per cent CAGR.

In the near-term, the generic opportunity will continue to lure more companies. And, with competition intensifying, generic drugs will see greater price erosion.

Along with higher competition, the global generic market is set to face another hurdle in the longer term. Already, R&D productivity of large global pharmaceutical players (innovators) has slowed considerably over the past few years. R&D productivity, a function of cost of new drug development and returns from those new drugs, is of critical importance as global players invest heavily in R&D (about 20 per cent of revenues). First, the average cost of developing a new drug has more than doubled in the past five years to $1.5 billion. Second, R&D activities by global players have resulted in only a handful of new molecules.

Further, returns from these few novel drugs have not reached the scale seen in the previous decade. Unlike highly successful launches in the past, such as Lipitor, most patented drugs launched over the five years have not been able to garner sales in excess of $1 billion. The slowing down of new drug launches will mean that the generic opportunity set to open up in the next decade (post 2020) is likely to be significantly lower.

For sustaining growth, Indian drug-makers will, therefore, be forced to look at newer avenues such as entering niche segments, building relationships with global pharma for joint research and development and widening distribution networks through marketing alliances. Other potential thrust areas include bio-pharmaceuticals, contract research and manufacturing, and new drug research.

The Indian bio-pharmaceutical industry is in its emerging stage and is sized at about $1.4 billion as of 2010-11. However, Indian bio-pharmaceutical players largely market vaccines and are yet to make inroads into U.S. and Europe. With the looming patent expiry of many bio-pharmaceutical products globally, Indian firms will look to build capabilities to capitalise on the opportunity that will arise.

The low cost of manufacturing renders India as an attractive destination for contract research, and the availability of a large patient pool makes it appealing for clinical trials, which contributes the most, in terms of revenue, to the contract research segment. An increased presence in contract research will also help them build expertise to move up the value chain and engage in new drug development.

Indian industry's R&D capabilities currently lie in reverse engineering drugs and in process chemistry. With limited experience and high costs associated with bringing a drug to the market, Indian players have traditionally shied away from drug discovery, or in a few cases, out-licensed molecules to multinational companies at early stage of development.

At present, only a handful of Indian companies (leading the pack are: Piramal Life Sciences, Glenmark and Sun Pharma) are engaged in new drug research; consequently, there are only 70-80 molecules in the pipeline from Indian players, of which more than two-thirds are still in early clinical phases. Amid slower growth in the generics space, large Indian players will look to enhance their focus in this area. The high-risk high-return field of new drug research holds tremendous potential for Indian players.

The author is Director, Crisil Research, a division of Crisil. Feedback to msamar@crisil.com

Keywords: Indian pharmaceutical industry

http://www.thehindu.com/business/article3339963.ece

India and China must remember common threat amid missile fuss

India and China must remember common threat amid missile fuss

Global Times | April 22, 2012 20:05
By Global Times

 

The successful launch of the long-range nuclear-capable Angi-V missile on Thursday was applauded and celebrated by many Indian analysts and media outlets. They associate the move with India's wish to set China as a reference point for its military development, and believe that India is going to join the global intercontinental missile club soon.
In fact, India has little to celebrate. Up until the 1980s, India was far more advanced than China in both economy as well as technology. After that, China raced ahead, and today has outclassed India in both areas.
The Manmohan Singh government, because of pressure from NATO member countries, has kept a slow pace with their Integrated Guided Missile Program (IGMP).
The Agni-V is deemed to be in its final stage, whereas in fact the IGMP ought to have progressed to develop a range of 9,000 kilometers.
The celebrations over the missile conceal the inadequacies and slow pace of the program, and hide the fact that successive Indian governments have capitulated to pressure from NATO to restrict the range and power of their launch vehicles.
By now, India ought to be a space power. However, the country is so far behind China in this field that it is embarrassing.
India faces a huge vulnerability. More than 80 percent of its critical weapons systems are imported from France, the US, Russia and Israel.
If these countries cut off supplies or ammunition during a conflict, India would be helpless.
India's recent military output, including a strategic growth in nuclear forces and arms purchasing, is designed to catch the eye. But for how long can borrowed weaponry lead to genuine security?
The fact is, weapons systems imported from abroad are subject to a massive risk of supply disruption.
Those in India who celebrate because the country has become a favorite destination of international arms dealers are just being foolish.
Sadly, it is easy to please the Indian government. All that is needed is flattery.
By playing up the "China threat" and postulating that India can "counter and contain China," vested interests are hoping to ensure that more and more money is spent on foreign weapons systems rather than domestic manufacture.
It is also interesting to see the Indian public's response to the boost of military strength, especially the latest test of the Agni-V missile. There are lots of nationalistic voices to be heard at the moment, they say that the Indian people are strong, the military is motivated and there is no fear of China among the ordinary people.
However, both countries should beware of efforts to create widespread fear and tension. Bad relations between India and China will hurt both countries and aid those who seek to subjugate Asia and the world.
Both Indian and Chinese commentators need to look at the bigger picture and focus on the common threat faced by both peoples; the efforts to derail their nation's development and weaken them internally.
Patriotism is only genuine when it is expressed in a way that helps the country. If expressed in ways that are harmful to national interests, then it is false patriotism.
India still suffers from a lack of funds for infrastructure construction and public voices are speaking out to say that the government should spend more on civil livelihood projects, rather than military schemes. There are similar arguments in China, too.
At China's stage of development, it is not possible to completely separate the military from the civilian.
In the case of both countries, the development of technology is crucial to a better future which means a certain amount of sacrifice has been necessary in recent times.
But it would be short-sighted to slow down on military research and development. On the contrary, technological innovation stemming from military research can help other aspects of the economy to become more competitive internationally. This has to be explained to the people.
Although there is an international effort to paint India and China as enemies and to make the two countries go to war with each other, such an effort will fail. The Chinese and Indian people share a long history and culture, and what is needed is more discussion between the two about their economics, education, tourism and culture.
We must create so many bridges of friendship that the plans of other countries to make China and India into enemies will fail. Together, India and China can make Asia strong. Divided, not only these two countries but all of Asia will remain weak.

The article was compiled by Global Times reporter Chen Chenchen based on an interview with M.D. Nalapat, director and professor of the School of Geopolitics at Manipal University in India. chenchenchen@globaltimes.com.cn

http://www.globaltimes.cn/NEWS/tabid/99/ID/706077/India-and-China-must-remember-common-threat-amid-missile-fuss.aspx

Rival for US maritime power looming fast on the horizon

Rival for US maritime power looming fast on the horizon

Global Times | April 22, 2012 20:10
By James Holmes

 

China can build a strong navy, and it is. Some Western commentators maintain that a continental power like China can never compete with a world-straddling naval power like the United States. A century ago Captain Alfred Thayer Mahan, the second president of our Naval War College, proclaimed that no nation could rank as a great land power and a great sea power at the same time, or at least not for long.
The exigencies of land defense siphon too many resources from maritime pursuits. If Mahan had it right, Chinese marine ambitions will ultimately come to grief. Skeptical pundits today commonly invoke the Chinese battle fleets' long absence from the high seas, or the Qing Dynasty's (1644-1911) inability to construct a strong navy during its waning days, or Mao Zedong's famous indifference to naval endeavors. Geographic and cultural impediments, they say, are too much to overcome.
As Admiral John Cunningham aptly observed, "it might take the navy three years to build a new fleet" but "300 years to build a new tradition." The hurdles in front of Chinese sea power are high. But few outcomes are preordained given human ingenuity and perseverance.
Indeed, Mahan's homeland rebuts his thesis. The US is a great land power. Because its frontiers face no serious threat, the republic can spare the resources for sea power, as it started doing in the 1880s, when shipwrights laid the keels for the US Navy's first modern men-of-war. Tranquil borders afford Beijing the same luxury. If China stays on good terms with its neighbors, easing the burden of land defense, it may replicate America's feat by the fin de siècle.
Now, how will China employ its navy?
Some Chinese sea-power proponents chafe at Beijing's apparent reluctance to use the People's Liberation Army Navy (PLA Navy) to settle matters in the South and East China seas.
I would describe this as prudent diplomacy. Sea power encompasses far more than navies. For Mahan, sea power was founded on international commerce, merchant and naval fleets, and overseas bases where ships could pause for supplies and repairs. Land-based weaponry plays its part in this high-tech age. Even ships deployed by non-military agencies like China Maritime Surveillance represent useful tools in the toolkit.
Think about last week's standoff at Scarborough Shoal, west of Luzon. The Philippine Navy is little more than a coast guard. Indeed, its flagship is a surplus US Coast Guard cutter of 1960s vintage. Beijing enjoys the luxury of dispatching unarmed or lightly armed vessels to uphold its maritime territorial claims vis-à-vis such a force. Doing so spares China from looking like a bully. And China's leadership always has the option of escalating by deploying PLA Navy vessels that can vastly outgun their Philippine counterparts, making the outcome of any armed clash a foregone conclusion. Manila understands that PLA Navy firepower stands behind Chinese cutters cruising contested waters, and the Philippine officials are reluctant to push too hard. That knowledge translates into a kind of virtual coercion and deterrence for China.
Using the maritime enforcement agencies, or "five dragons," this way reflects a broad, sophisticated understanding of the political uses of ships. I would handle matters similarly if I were overseeing Chinese maritime operations.
Lastly, how can China ease fellow seagoing nations' qualms toward its burgeoning nautical might? The only way is to establish a track record for living by its rhetoric. Foreign observers measure words against deeds.
Take it from me: Americans still hear from our Latin American friends about the "banana wars" of the early 20th century! Telling others that China seeks only "peaceful development," harbors only goodwill and the like only goes so far.
If China is a benign seafaring nation, it must prove it through its actions at sea. China is amassing formidable sea power. How skillfully it wields that power remains to be seen.
The author is an associate professor at the US Naval War College. opinion@globaltimes.com.cn

http://www.globaltimes.cn/NEWS/tabid/99/ID/706078/Rival-for-US-maritime-power-looming-fast-on-the-horizon.aspx

Espanha perdendo espaço na América Latina! Qual a novidade?

Un actor importante con papel secundario

Los proyectos regionales, la pujanza de Brasil y la decadencia de las cumbres iberoamericanas restan peso a España | La importancia de las inversiones y las ayudas no se refleja en el peso político

Política | 22/04/2012 - 00:00h

FERNANDO GARCÍA | SÃO PAULO

Corresponsal

En la América Latina de hoy, España es un pariente lejano aunque omnipresente con quien cada cual trata a su modo y conveniencia. La diplomacia peninsular suele hablar de "fluidez y riqueza" en los vínculos, con obvias salvedades de última hora. Pero, vista en conjunto, la relación no sólo es compleja sino también paradójica.
La importancia de la inversión española en Latinoamérica, así como de sus ayudas a la cooperación y de los intercambios culturales, no parece tener una correspondencia proporcionada en términos de peso y presencia generales. Mientras en el mundo empresarial y universitario España es allí uno de los grandes protagonistas externos, en el ámbito político da la impresión de ser más bien un actor secundario. Telefónica, Repsol, Santander y BBVA copan los rótulos, pero la marca-país no aparece, y es opinable si debiera estar más presente.
Hay unos cuantos factores que lo explican. La proliferación de acuerdos, proyectos y experimentos de integración regional; la pujanza de Brasil como referente político y líder continental, y la progresiva toma de posiciones de China en la zona, más la ventajosa situación de EE.UU. en todos los sentidos, han ido desplazando a la vieja madre patria hacia una segundo plano de la escena. También es discutible, y de hecho se discute, que Madrid haya hecho lo suficiente para evitarlo.
Si las cumbres iberoamericanas sirven como termómetro de la relación, habrá que reconocer que desde mucho antes del tormentón en Argentina el ambiente era frío. A la última reunión, celebrada en la capital de Paraguay en octubre pasado, faltaron 11 de los 21 jefes de Estado o de gobierno convocados. Un plantón sin precedentes en la historia del más relevante cónclave familiar.
Brillaron especialmente las ausencias de Dilma Rousseff, Cristina Fernández, Hugo Chávez y Raúl Castro, que nunca quiso asistir a la cita aun cuando su hermano Fidel sí solía hacerlo antes de caer enfermo en el 2006.
Aunque no se tratara de un boicot, el fiasco resultó significativo. Las cumbres iberoamericanas, lanzadas en 1991, venían sirviendo como cauce de una renovada pero cálida relación entre Latinoamérica y la Península. Las reuniones impulsaban y daban visibilidad al papel de España como gran interlocutor europeo de América Latina al tiempo que servían como único foro interamericano sin tutela de EE.UU.
El fracaso de Asunción fue seguramente una señal de agotamiento de la fórmula de las cumbres y tal vez del modelo de relación; de un mayoritario cansancio debido a la abulia de unos y el distanciamiento de otros.
El "¡Por qué no te callas!" del Rey a Chávez en la convocatoria del 2007 fue algo más que un incidente chocante y hasta divertido. Al margen del éxito de público que la frase cosechó a ambos lados del océano, la riña demostró la dificultad de lidiar con líderes populistas que basan una parte sustancial de su discurso en la retórica anticolonial o indigenista, algunas veces con razón y otras muchas con evidente demagogia.
Pero la relación con Latinoamérica va por barrios, y cada país y bloque ideológico es un mundo. Las dispares reacciones en el caso Repsol, desde el apoyo entusiasta de Venezuela hasta el rechazo contundente de México, son el recordatorio más reciente.
En la calle, la imagen que los latinoamericanos tienen de España es positiva. Los sondeos señalan un 70% de opiniones favorables. Puede que ciertas políticas tengan algo que ver. España, con sus ayudas a la cooperación, figura hoy como el primer donante bilateral en la región. Y su ley de Memoria Histórica va a permitir, una vez termine de tramitarse, que casi 400.000 latinoamericanos adquieran la nacionalidad de sus padres o abuelos y se hagan con un pasaporte europeo.
Pero los efectos de la crisis a los dos lados del Atlántico no perdonan, como ya vemos. A partir de ahora, además, la inversión y la ayuda española pueden disminuir mientras las exigencias de los destinatarios aumentan. Y no está claro quién necesita más a la otra parte, como los flujos migratorios indican. Así que España, con todo su derecho a defenderse de abusos, tendrá que hilar delgado para que la disputa con Argentina no derive en trifulca mayor, esto es, en gran conflicto de familia, que a veces son los peores.

http://www.lavanguardia.com/politica/20120422/54285104147/actor-importante-papel-secundario.html